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 LOW VOLUME GRADE CROSSING TREATMENTS FOR THE 
OREGON HIGH SPEED RAIL CORRIDOR 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Highway-rail crossing safety is a fundamental concern for any effort to increase 
passenger rail speeds in the United States. Since the 1970s $2.3 billion has been 
marked for crossing improvements in this country. Even so, 1993 estimates from 
the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) total 626 fatalities and  1,837 injuries 
caused by 4,892 collisions at highway-rail crossings (Texas 1995). Passive warning 
systems cannot be relied on, even on low volume roads, when rail speeds increase 
beyond the original crossing design speeds. Further, as trains reach higher speeds, 
the likelihood of a collision causing a derailment increases greatly. Highway-rail 
crossings must be adequate not only to warn motorists, but to fully protect rail 
travel as well. 
1.1  Background 
Grade crossings for truly high speed rail operation are technically simple 
above 200 kph (125 mph) federal regulations require complete separation of all 
grade crossings. Below 130 kph (80 mph) the present systems work well or can be 
upgraded in fairly straightforward ways. The intermediate range of operation, from 
130 to 200 kph, presents challenges and possibilities for grade crossing design. 
Medium and high volumes of highway traffic will still require grade separation 
wherever possible. Low volume crossings, however, cannot justify the high costs of 
grade separation. Certainly many, if not most, such crossings will be closed and 
their traffic consolidated with other, upgraded crossings. But in rural areas, 
practical alternate routes do not exist for many crossings. New approaches must be 
found to provide safe, economical low volume crossings. 2 
At the same time, Intelligent Transportation System (ITS) technologies are 
receiving extensive study and trials throughout the world. Much of this work is 
directed at improving highway travel. Highway-rail crossings presently are 
protected by electromechanical systems whose basic operation has not changed in 
decades. The new communications and control technologies made possible by 
digital computers and incorporated in the various ITS technologies offer 
possibilities for greatly increasing highway-rail crossing safety. 
1.2  Purpose 
Affordable treatments for the many low volume grade crossings are an essential 
part of any plan for incremental high speed rail development. This research lays the 
groundwork for developing low cost treatments for low-volume highway-rail grade 
crossings which will meet the safety requirements of high speed rail corridors. 
Technologies being developed as part of intelligent transportation systems are 
evaluated for their applicability to this problem. This background is applied to 
analyzing the crossings in the Section 1010 high speed rail corridor located in 
Oregon's Willamette Valley. Treatments appropriate to different classes of crossings 
are proposed. This report presents the work of the first two phases of a planned 
three phase project. The third phase will test one or more actual installations at 
locations identified in the second phase research. 
1.3  Scope 
This report is based on review of a broad range of literature from government, 
research, and trade sources relating to grade crossing safety, train control, and 
intelligent transportation systems. It presents information on current practice and 
on systems in development in the United States and other countries. It offers a 
matrix of crossing categories and treatments, design guidelines, and suggestions for 
further research. 3 
Above 200 kph (125 mph) at-grade crossings are not acceptable. Much of the 
literature pertaining to high speed rail operations above 200 kph (125 mph) is 
therefore outside the scope of this report. Pedestrian crossings present special 
problems; they too are largely outside the scope of this report. 
1.4  A Framework for UnderstandingThree Tasks 
Grade crossing safety depends on the success of three primary tasks: acquiring 
real-time information about the train; acquiring real-time information about the 
crossing; and creating correct responses to that information. This typology is 
closely akin to that of Lerner, Ratte, and Walker; they distinguish between accidents 
caused by failure to acquire necessary information and those caused by failure to 
appropriately process and apply information (Lerner et al 1989. pg3-48f). 
Historically, drivers on the road acquired information by looking and listening at 
crossings. Train operators looked ahead, visually assessing the condition of the 
crossing. Correct responses were based on an expectation of good sensedrivers 
would not try to "beat the train" and operators would apply the brakes if the 
crossing was not clear. Increasing train speeds, increasing traffic volumes, the need 
for greater efficiency, and sad experience all have moved us towards more 
sophisticated systems of control at rail crossings. 
Intelligent Transportation System (ITS) technologies hold great promise for 
improvements in all three of the fundamental tasks required. ITS systems will be 
essential for providing maximum safety for high speed rail while continuingto 
improve the overall efficiency and dependability of all rail transportation. 
Throughout this report, technologies and techniques, in use and proposed, are 
discussed as means of acquiring and/or communicating information about train or 
crossing status or as means of ensuring a correct response to the information 
provided. We hope that readers will come to look at some technologies in new 
ways and that new possibilities may emerge for increasing highway-rail crossing 
safety. 4 
Following this introductory section, the report presents the regulatory 
framework within which highway-rail crossing treatments must be considered in 
the United States. The report then presents issues and procedures relating to grade 
crossing closures and consolidation. Discussion of current, conventional crossing 
treatments precedes discussion of ITS technologies and their potential application 
to crossings. The crossings in Oregon are used as a specific set to aid in developing 
five categories of low volume crossings. These are matched to crossing treatments. 
The elements of the treatments are described. The report concludes with a 
preliminary cost/benefit analysis and recommendations for further study. A 
glossary of acronyms is provided as an appendix. 5 
2. REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
 
Any consideration of improving highway-rail crossings must take place within 
the framework of regulations governing both rail and roadway construction and 
operation. Proposed systems must either fit within existing regulations or be 
beneficial enough to warrant seeking a change in regulations. Requirements for 
railroad equipment and operating procedures vary from country to country, as do 
the speed ranges in which requirements come into effect. Highway design and 
control also varies significantly from nation to nation. United States regulations 
provide the primary framework for this report. Our study also is significantly 
guided by a set of joint recommendations on grade-crossing safety put forward by 
agencies of the United States Department of Transportation (USDOT). Though not 
regulatory, these recommendations present a strong direction. Significant departure 
from this direction would demand justification almost equal to that required for 
changes to actual regulations. 
2.1  FRA Regulations 
The Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 49 Subtitle B Chapter II (parts 200­
266) presents FRA regulations. Of particular interest to the development and 
implementation of high speed rail (HSR) in the United States are regulations 
which govern requirements for given maximum train speeds, radio 
communications, grade crossing systems, and the petition process. 
2.1.1  SPEED REGIMES 
Throughout most of the United States, standard operating speeds for trains are 
up to 128 kph (80 mph). Above that speed, several distinct operating regimes have 
been recognized in federal regulations and recommendations (Table 2.1). 6 
Table 2.1  High speed rail operating requirements. 
Maximum Speed 
Passenger Service  Requirements 
kph (mph) 
130 (80)  Class 4 Track. 
Block signals or manual block. 
145 (90)  Class 5 Track. 
Automatic cab signal, train stop, or train control. 
175 (110)  Class 6 Track. 
Automatic cab signal, train stop, or train control. 
200 (125)  Requires Special Approval from FRA. 
above 200 (125)  Requires Special Approval from FRA. 
All crossings grade separated. 
Standards for maximum speed exist for various classes of track. These are given 
in CFR 49 §213.9. Track class specifications are given in the following sections of 
CFR 49 Part 213 and include standards for track geometry, track structure, and 
inspection schedules. CFR 49 §213.10(c) indicates that operating speeds over 175 
kph (110 mph) require prior approval of the FRA. It continues: 
Petitions for approval must be filed in the manner and contain the 
information required by § 211.11 of this chapter. Each petition must 
provide sufficient information concerning the performance characteristics 
of the track, signaling, grade crossing protection (italics added), trespasser 
control where appropriate, and equipment involved and also concerning 
maintenance and inspection practices and procedures to be followed, to 
establish that the proposed speed can be sustained in safety. 
Maximum speeds are also governed by the type of train control in effect. CFR 
49 Part 236 presents standards for signals and train control. Maximum speeds 
under various controls are given in CFR 49 § 236.0. Other sections detail structural, 
electrical, and operating characteristics of signals and control systems. Of particular 7 
interest for HSR applications is CFR 49 Subpart E "Automatic Train Stop, Train 
Control and Cab Signal Systems." 
Terminology can become confusing at this point. No standard usage has 
emerged. Harrison (Harrison 1995 pg.117) has suggested that 200 kph (125mph) 
is the generally accepted minimum threshold to speak of high speed rail. However, 
federally designated 1010 HSR corridors are generally taking a phase-in approach to 
high speed rail. Maximum speeds of 150-200 kph (90-125 mph) are typical goals 
(ibid. pg. 120-121 and see Table 2.2). It is precisely in this range that ITS 
technologies hold particular promise for allowing at-grade crossings to be 
maintained with high levels of safety and efficiency, avoiding the costly alternative 
of full grade separation required for higher speeds. 
Table 2.2  Designated Section 1010 high speed rail corridors. 
Corridor  Length 
km (mi)  Proposed hsr Development 
Washington, D.C.  770 (479)  current maximum speed 130 kph; 
Richmond  Raleigh  proposed max. 150 kph 
Charlotte 
Chicago  Detroit  449 (279)  recommended phased program to 
max running speeds of 200 kph 
Chicago  Milwaukee  700 (435)  section 1010 proposal for 
(-Twin Cities)  Chicago-Milwaukee portion is to 
achieve 1 50 kph 
Tampa Orlando  Miami  411  (255)  Franchise proposals failed; state 
still interested in hsr. 
Eugene  Portland  760 (464)  proposed incremental 
Seattle  Vancouver, B.C.  improvements: first phase up to 
150 kph, second phase up to max 
speed of 200 kph 8 
2.1.2  HIGHWAY-RAIL CROSSING SIGNALS 
CFR 49 Part 234 governs crossing signal system safety. Of particular note are § 
234.223 and § 234.225 which specify timing for warning devices and gate arms. 
These state that: 
the minimum activation time for any warning system is 20 seconds before 
the crossing is occupied by rail traffic; 
each gate arm shall start its downward motion not less than three seconds 
after the lights begin flashing; 
each gate arm shall reach horizontal a minimum of five seconds before any 
train arrives at the crossing; and 
"At those crossings equipped with four quadrant gates, the timing 
requirements of this section apply to entrance gates only." 
2.1.3  RADIO COMMUNICATIONS 
CFR 49 Part 220 governs radio communications standards and procedures. It 
prescribes the minimum requirements for the use of voice communications by 
radio in railroad operations. Transmission of train orders by radio is specifically 
covered in § 220.61. The use of data radio is not yet included in the CFR, though 
"digital radio," apparently referring to digital data radio from computer to 
computer, is referred to in Section 11 of the Rail Safety Enforcement and Review Act 
(Railroad Communication 1994). 
2.1.4  PETITIONS FOR RULEMAKING 
Operation of any railroad segment above 175 kph (110 mph) requires prior 
approval from the FRA. Other nonstandard rail system componentscrossing 9 
warnings, control and communications systemsmay also require prior approval 
or waiver of certain regulations. The requirements for rulemaking petitions and the 
procedures followed in responding to petitions are presented in CFR 49 Part 211. 
2.2  Highway Regulations 
In the United States, all highway signs, warning devices, and barriers are 
governed by the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices (MUTCD) and the 
Roadside Design Guide. Though these are presented as recommendations only, court 
rulings have effectively given them the force of required regulations. 
2.2.1  MUTCD 
Part VIII of the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices contains the 
standards for traffic control systems at highway-rail at grade crossings. The MUTCD 
also presents general standards for warning, regulatory, and guide signs, for 
barricades, and for hazard warning signals as well as other areas which may have 
application to the design of new systems for safe highway-rail crossings. MUTCD 
standards are constantly in a process of review and, potentially, revision to 
incorporate new understandings and give guidance in new situations. 
2.2.1.1 PRESENT STANDARDS 
Part VIII is titled "Traffic Control Systems for Railroad-Highway Grade 
Crossings." Section A covers general provisions, stressing the basic themes which 
govern all aspects of the MUTCD: design, placement, operation, maintenance, and 
uniformity. Crossings not serving a demonstrable need should be closed. Section B 
details signs and markingsthese are the passive components of warning and 
control at crossings. Section C covers the active aspects of crossing designs, signals 
and gates. Where highly variable train speeds are anticipated, constant warning 
time circuits for signal/gate triggering are encouraged. 10 
The general standards for signs, Part II, will apply to any new signs that may be 
required for crossing treatments, including variable message signs for traveler 
information, cf. §2A-5. Barricades and channelizing devices are the subject of 
section 6.C. In particular, §6C-8 describes the design oftype III barricades, which 
§3F-1 specifies for use at a closure or termination of a roadwayin this case the 
striping pattern substitutes red and white for orange and white. Section 4E 
describes hazard beacons as well as signs and devices for other, non-rail 
intermittent right-of-way interrupting hazards, i.e. movable bridges. 
2.2.1.2 NEW STANDARDS FOR HSR AND LOW VOLUME ROADS 
MUTCD standards for high speed rail grade crossings are currently under 
consideration. The National Committee on Uniform Traffic Control Devices 
discussed several HSR related issues at its January 1995 meeting. Areas discussed 
include timing sequences for four quadrant gates and absorbing barriers, advance 
warning signs, constant warning time equipment, vehicle intrusion detection, and 
crossing-to-train communications. The committee is also concerned that little 
attention has yet been given to pedestrians at high speed rail crossings (Koester 
1995). 
Recommended revisions currently under consideration will specify three 
categories of low volume roads, with varying warning requirements at railroad 
crossings. Roads with volumes of less than 200 Annual Average Daily Traffic will be 
considered low volume. Category One is unimproved primitive roadsnot graded, 
not drained, dirt or gravel surfaces. Category Two roads are graded, drained, and 
have a stabilized surface. Category Three roads are paved. The recommendations 
suggest railroad crossbucks for all three categories. Railroad crossing advance 
warning signs would be used for all Category Three roads, but for Category One 
and Two only where the crossing is not visible an adequate distance in advance. 
These suggestions assume low volume roads will have passive controls; higher 
speed rail will require more. 11 
2.2.2  ROADSIDE DESIGN GUIDE 
The Roadside Design Guide from AASHTO states: 
"While it is a readily accepted fact that safety can best be served by keeping 
motorists on the road, the focus of this guide is on safety treatments that 
minimize the likelihood of serious injuries when a driver does run off the 
road." (Roadside 1989, preface pg. i) 
The most fundamental concept for the Roadside Design Guide is that of the 
"clear zone." The clear zone is a variable width region adjoining the traveled way 
(traffic lane and shoulder) which is to be kept clear of hazards. The clear zone 
width varies with design speed and topography. The Guide calls for hazardous 
obstacles within the clearzone to be removed or rendered non-hazardous by 
redesign or protective treatment. 
Section 4.6.3 discusses potential roadside hazards from railroad warning 
devices. Warning device supports for signals or gates can cause an increase in the 
severity of injuries to vehicle occupants if struck at high speeds. "In these cases, 
consideration should be given to shielding the support with a crash cushion if the 
support is located in the clear zone" (Roadside 1989, pg. 4-12). The Guide cautions 
designers against protecting the vehicle from the impact of hitting a warning device 
support in a manner that might redirect the vehicle into the path of a train. 
Roadside Barriers are covered in Chapter 5 of the Guide. In this context, the 
roadside barriers considered are those designed for uses alongside a roadway, not 
across what would be the traveled way. Nonetheless, the basic warrant offered has 
broader application: "If the consequences of a vehicle striking a fixed object hazard 
or running off the road are believed to be more serious than hitting a traffic barrier, 
then the barrier is considered warranted." (Roadside 1989 pg.5-2). When 
considering the possibility of a vehicle causing a train derailment, it may be 
appropriate to think of this as an extreme case of the "innocent bystander" 
problem which is considered in section 5.2.3. Such cases typically involve 
protection of pedestrians or those in school yards or buildings adjacent to busy 
roads. Barriers may be warranted even if no actual hazard exists in the clear zone. 12 
If impact attenuating barriers are considered for protecting rail traffic with 
minimum damage to intruding vehicles, Chapter 8 of the Guide "Crash Barriers" 
should be consulted. Movable forms of both energy absorbing drum and dragnet 
systems have been proposed for rail-highway crossings. Chapter 8 gives 
considerable information about operational, fixed forms of such systems. 
2.3  Rail-Highway Joint Recommendations 
As train speeds go up, the need for control of crossings also increases, as does 
the difficulty and expense of achieving increased control. Table 2.3 shows the three 
ranges currently designated and the crossing treatments recommended in the Rail-
Highway Crossing Safety Action Plan Support Proposals which represent the combined 
thinking of FHWA, FRA, FTA, and NHTSA. Reducing the number of crossings 
through consolidations and closings is one essential part of creating a safe and 
efficient high speed rail corridor. For the highest speeds, crossings which cannot be 
eliminated must be grade separated. ITS applications come into play in the 
intermediate high speed ranges. In the lower range, from 128 to 176 kph, ITS 
technologies can help assure driver compliance and safety. In the higher range, 
from 177 to 200 kph, ITS will assure efficient and reliable protection for the trains. 
2.4  Oregon Revised Statutes 
ORS 763 presents Oregon statutory law regarding railroad crossings. ORS 
763.013 states the policy of the state "to achieve uniform and coordinated 
regulation of railroad-highway crossings and to eliminate crossings at grade 
wherever possible;" therefore authority to control and regulate crossings is vested 
exclusively in the state. Section 763.130 deals with private crossings. Those without 
automatic warning devices are required to have stop signs, unless placing a stop 
sign would create a greater hazard. After any required hearings, the state may "alter, 
relocate, or close any farm or private grade crossing on any line designated as  a 
high speed rail system." For any takings this may involve, the Oregon Department 13 
Table 2.3  Action Plan recommendations. 
Rail Speed kph (mph) 
128-176 (80-110) 
177-200 (111-125) 
above 200 (125) 
Public Crossings 
Eliminate all redundant or 
unnecessary crossings. Install 
most sophisticated traffic 
control/warning devices 
compatible with the location, 
e.g., median barriers, special 
signing (possibly active 
advance warning), four 
quadrant gates. Automated 
devices should be equipped 
with constant warning time 
equipment. 
Protect rail movement with 
full width barriers capable of 
absorbing impact of highway 
vehicle. Include a fail safe 
vehicle detection capability 
between barriers. Notify 
approaching trains of warning 
device or barrier failure or of 
an intruding vehicle in 
sufficient time for the train to 
stop short of the crossing 
with out resorting to 
emergency brake application. 
Close or grade separate all 
highway-rail crossings. 
Private Crossings 
Close, grade separate, and 
provide a secured barrier or 
automatic devices for private 
crossings. Device or barrier 
should extend across the 
entire highway on both sides 
of the track, should normally 
be closed and opened on 
request, if no train is 
approaching, for a period of 
time sufficient to cross the 
track(s). 
Protect rail movement with 
full width barrier or gate, 
normally closed and locked, 
capable of absorbing impact 
of a highway vehicle. Gate 
lock or control should be 
interlocked with train signal 
and control system and 
released by a railroad 
dispatcher. A fail safe vehicle 
detection or video system 
should monitor the area 
between the barriers. The 
crossing should be equipped 
with a direct link telephone to 
the railroad dispatcher. 
Close or grade separate all 
highway-rail crossings. 
of Transportation may use its power of eminent domain. Payments may be made 
from designated HSR funds. 14 
3. RECOMMENDED FIRST OPTION
 
CROSSING CONSOLIDATION
 
The most direct safety improvements come from eliminating at-grade highway-
railroad crossings. The Rail-Highway Crossing Safety Action Plan Support Proposals 
recommends consolidation/closure or grade separation for all crossings where 
trains will operate above 200 kph and wherever possible where trains operate 
between 128 and 200 kph. Consolidation of crossings allows a greater 
concentration of resources for upgrading remaining crossings. The goal is to 
balance the inconvenience caused by closures with increased access over nearby 
crossings. Ideally, enough resources would be available to grade-separate remaining 
crossings. Where this is not possible, ITS technologies can offer economical 
possibilities for providing a significantly improved level of safety and convenience 
at remaining crossings. In addition, some very low volume crossings, principally 
private, often agricultural, crossings, cannot practically be served by other 
consolidated crossings. In these instances it is particularly necessary to provide low-
cost, safe alternatives to grade separation. Consolidation allows wise use of 
resources where they are most needed for the particular circumstances of each rail 
corridor. 
3.1  Recommended Procedure 
Crossing elimination is typically part of a larger process of crossing 
consolidation along a rail corridor. This may be as part of a safety improvement 
plan. It may be in response to local officials' requests for crossing upgrades. Where 
crossings are largely redundant, some may be closed while those retained are 
upgraded. 
In any crossing elimination, local approval is vital. Even if the state has the 
authority to close a crossing, it very rarely will without local agreement. In the 
Guide to Crossing Consolidation and Closure (Highway-Railroad 1994) FHWA and FRA 
recommend a process to reach safe, well supported decisions about closures. 15 
The process begins with screening the crossing proposed for closure. The 
planner or engineer checks the particular crossing and those surrounding it for 
safety and the level of redundancy. Approval to close a crossing is very rarely based 
on safety issues. The most successful projects have an alternative route which will 
not significantly increase travel time (i.e. the crossing is redundant). It is difficult to 
close a hazardous crossing that is not redundant. Traffic safety is nonetheless of 
great importance. It is vital, if consolidation is going to be achieved, that the 
diverted traffic goes across the track at a point with a greater level of warning 
devices and that the crossing can also accommodate the increased level of traffic. 
The process continues with coordination of state and local authorities, community 
profile and participation, and a working-through of corridor analysis. This crossing 
consolidation process can be time consuming. It is important, though, that the 
guidelines be followed if the consolidation is to succeed. If two or more elements 
of the model are missing then, more often than not, the consolidation will fail. 
The Guide to Crossing Consolidation and Closure provides a grade crossing 
consolidation check-list. 
3.2  ITS and Consolidation 
Crossing consolidations can often make funds go much further in upgrading 
remaining crossings. Nonetheless, full grade separation for the remaining crossings 
would be very expensive and even the first stepconsolidation and closure of 
crossingsmay prove very difficult in practice. ITS technologies may offer safe, 
reliable, efficient, and affordable alternatives for areas where trains will operate up 
to 200 kph. The Action Plan proposals for high speed rail crossings call for 
sophisticated traffic control /warning devices in both of the intermediate speed 
ranges above 128 kph. These devices all must function together in systems which 
meet the three fundamental tasks of crossing safety. 16 
3.3  Demand ManagementTrading Property 
Opportunities should also be sought to reduce the need for crossings. Many 
private crossings serve agricultural lands. Often the rail line cuts through farm land 
with comparable qualities on either side. In situations where farmers living on 
opposite sides of the line each have farm lands on the other side, it may be 
possible to arrange land trades to consolidate each farmer's property, each on one 
side of the tracks and accessible without crossings. Such a plan would not be 
simple. Acreage and land quality would seldom be quite equal; often a farmer's 
land is leased, not owned by the farmer. Even with the difficulties, avoiding the 
expense and risk of grade crossings may make it worth the effort. Where 
circumstances look promising, financial incentives for cooperation may be 
justified. The costs may even justify an extension of eminent domain to force such 
consolidations. 17 
4. CONVENTIONAL HIGHWAY-RAIL 
CROSSING PRACTICE 
Crossing conflicts, by definition, can occur only when a train enters or 
occupies an at-grade crossing. Given the presence of a train, the other half of a 
grade crossing conflict is the presence of another vehicle or pedestrian in the 
crossing. Preventing conflicts without eliminating the at-grade crossing requires 
knowledge of both the trains approaching the crossing and of the crossing itself 
whether vehicles are present and if the crossing control equipment is functional. 
Needed knowledge of train status includes the trains' location, direction of 
travel, speed, and stopping distance. Traditional timetable/train order and manual 
block signal systems provide guidance to train operators and knowledge of where 
trains are supposed to be. Automatic block systems, including those that 
incorporate automatic controls, rely on track circuits to detect the presence of a 
train in a given section of track and in the case of control systems, to relay 
information about train speed. 
Knowing the status of the crossing means knowing whether conflicting traffic 
is blocking the crossing. It also means knowing how dependable the crossing 
information is. As with trains, traditional methods have relied on warnings that 
make clear what the crossing status is supposed to be. When the lights are flashing 
and the gates down, no other vehicles should be entering the crossing. But this is 
not necessarily the actual reality. The problem of acquiring information about train 
and crossing status can further be understood from two separate angles: from the 
railroad side, train operators/systems must recognize the approach of the train to a 
potential conflict spot and determine if a conflict exists; from the highway side, 
drivers need to know of a deadly hazardthe traininterrupting or about to 
interrupt the roadway. 18 
4.1  Highway Approach 
Motorist error is the primary cause of train-motor vehicle accidents (Rozek 
1988, pg.49). The motorist must first be aware that a crossing is ahead. Then it is 
necessary to evaluate whether or not the crossing can be safely negotiated or 
whether it is necessary to stop for a present or oncoming train. Both vision and 
hearing are relied on to convey the required information. In passive systems, the 
driver must further use judgment to estimate the approach of a train in relation to 
his or her time to complete crossing the tracks. In active systems, the presumption 
is that judgment is not requiredwhen the gate is down it is not safe (as well as 
not legal) to proceed. Experience indicates that many motorists do not follow this 
presumption. 
4.1.1  PASSIVE WARNING SYSTEMS 
A passive warning device, typically the standard railroad crossbuck, alerts 
motorists to the presence of a highway-rail crossing. After being alerted to the 
upcoming crossing, awareness of an approaching train is based on motorists' 
vision and hearing. Sight distance is critical to reasonably safe functioning of 
crossings protected only by passive warnings. Sight is augmented by the "active" 
function of the train whistle or horn sounded by the train crew as they approach 
the crossing. Passive warnings are not adequate for HSR lines. 
4.1.2  ACTIVE WARNING SYSTEMS 
Active warning systems include flashing lights, bells, and warning gates. 
Current standard active warning devices for grade crossings are based  on track-
circuit activation. At a fixed distance from the crossing, the presence of a train will 
activate the warning lights, bells, and if present, gates. Constant warning time 
systems use more sophisticated track circuits for more sophisticated control. 19 
4.1.2.1 STANDARD FIXED ACTIVATION POINT 
In older systems where the location of the activation point is fixed, it must be 
related to the maximum authorized speed (MAS) for that part of the line. In no 
case may less than 20 seconds warning be given before a train enters the 
intersection. Where gates are present, those controlling approach traffic must be 
completely deployed (horizontal) not less than five seconds before a train enters 
the crossing. 
4.1.2.2 CONSTANT WARNING ARNING TIME 
At most crossings in the United States, the crossing activation circuit cannot 
recognize varying train speed and so the crossing warning time may vary greatly 
from train to train. Systems which do recognize train speed and provide a relatively 
constant warning time (CWT) are installed at about 6,000 crossings in the United 
States. The technology for current CWT was developed in the 1960s and uses a 
more complex, discriminating set of track circuits (Bowman et al. 1986). They have 
been found to be effective in reducing warning device violations by motorists 
(Halkias & Eck 1985, Bowman 1987). 
4.2  Railroad Approach 
Train crews must be aware of their approach to a crossing. They must be able 
to assess the status of the crossingis it clear? can they proceed? Finally, they must 
be able to respond to a blocked or defective crossing in a way consistent with the 
train control standards under which they are operating. 
4.2.1  CROSSING STATUS 
Train crews must assess the status of a crossing visually as they approach. They 
must first be vigilant enough to know they are approaching a crossing. They then 20 
require adequate sight distancea clear view of the crossing from a great enough 
distance that a full service brake (FSB) would stop the train before it entered the 
crossing. Poor weatherfog, snow, or heavy rainmay limit vision. At night, 
pedestrians, bicyclists, and perhaps stopped cars may not present the side lighting 
needed to be seen from up the track. Even when the crossing and its approaches 
can be clearly seen, the train operator's response must be based on judgment of 
whether approaching vehicles will indeed stop, and the assumption that stopped 
vehicles will remain stopped until the train is past. 
4.2.2  TRAIN CONTROL 
Traditionally, train operators have been aware of their position relative to 
crossings by knowledge of the line and by vision. Traditional railroad signal and 
control systems have been designed to locate trains in relation to other trains and 
track control features (e.g. switches). These systems have  not generally been tied to 
highway-railroad crossings. Nonetheless, a basic understanding of block systems will 
help in understanding how more advanced train control systems can be integrated 
with crossing control. 
To prevent two trains from trying to occupy the same piece of track at the same 
timea highly undesirable circumstancetracks are sectioned into blocks and 
trains must have an authority to occupy any given block. Authorities have been 
conferred by timetables and train orders, but a simple statement of what train 
should be where and when cannot deal with delays, breakdowns, or other 
unforeseen circumstances. 
An example may help clarify the central idea of track authority. One early 
system vested authority for a block in a single token. The train engineer would pick 
up the token at the start of the block and carry it to the other end. Only a train 
carrying that token could enter that block. Obviously this only worked where trains 
always arrived from alternating directions. 21 
4.2.2.1  AUTOMATIC BLOCK SIGNALS 
Today, most passenger rail lines are equipped with automatic block signals 
(ABS) (Ulman and Bing 1995). Any train present in a block, along with the 
switches and the rails themselves, creates an electrical circuit which controls the 
signals related to that block. If a train occupies a block, signals at the entrance to 
that block will be set to stop. Signals in the preceding block(s) will be set to 
caution. Other blocks will show a clear signal. The various block signals are called 
"aspects." In a simple three-aspect ABS system, a train operator seeing a caution 
aspect must begin to stop and the block length must be sufficient to permit a safe 
stop from the maximum authorized speed (MAS). ABS systems with more aspects 
provide levels of caution, effectively lowering the MAS for a block under an early 
caution aspect. This then allows shorter block lengths, more sophisticated train 
control, and closer headways. 
4.2.2.2  CENTRAL TRAIN CONTROL 
ABS, as described above, applies to track with an established direction of travel, 
as one would have with double tracks each signaled for travel in one direction. Bi­
directional use of single track requires a more complex traffic control system (TCS). 
Where all interlockings and control points are controlled from one location, this is 
called centralized traffic control (CTC). Control is typically through coded track 
circuitsseveral distinct codes can be sent at one or more carrier frequencies 
through the track in a block. Areas without CTC are "dark" regions. CTC areas are 
visible to dispatchers at a resolution fixed by the block length. The dispatcher 
knows whether or not a train is in a given block. Without calling the train operator, 
the dispatcher can only infer which train is in a block and what its speed and 
direction are. Even in a system with several signal aspects, each block must be long 
enough for significant change (higher speed to lower, lower speed to stop). This 
greatly limits the precision of the dispatcher's knowledge. 22 
4.2.2.3 CAB SIGNALS 
At higher speeds it becomes more difficult to accurately read wayside signal 
aspects from the engine cab. Above 130 kph (80 mph) train operations must be 
protected by some means of compensating for this difficulty. Cab signals bring the 
aspect indications for the block into the cab with the train operator. In addition to 
continuously indicating the current aspect, a change to a more restrictive aspect is 
accompanied by an audible signal which continues until manually acknowledged. 
4.2.2.4 AUTOMATIC TRAIN STOP 
Another approach to protecting higher speed operations is a system which will 
automatically apply the brakes if the operator fails to respond to a more restrictive 
condition coming into effect. As with cab signals, automatic train stop is tied to the 
automatic block system or central train control. Also as with cab signals, an audible 
warning sounds in the cab when a more restrictive condition is encountered. The 
train operator must respond to the restriction or the ATS will apply the brakes. 23 
5. ITS TECHNOLOGIES
 
5.1  Introduction 
ITS technologies hold promise for improving information, communication, 
and control at highway-rail crossings. These may be combined to provide levels of 
safety unattainable with conventional approaches at a cost still far below that of 
full grade separation. Various component systems, linked by digital 
communication channels, can greatly enhance the ability of train operators and 
motorists to succeed at the three tasks of crossing safety. 
In the United States, it has been the responsibility of drivers to correctly 
recognize and respond to approaching trains. Passive signs combined with the 
sight and sound of approaching trains or the use of active warning devices are 
expected to create an appropriate response. On low volume roads and with trains 
operating in the range of 128 to 176 kph warning devices alone may still be 
adequate crossing protection. For this to be the case, the warnings must be 
convincing. Along with basic education and enforcement, ITS can help provide 
consistent, reliable, and convincing information to assure the highest level of 
compliance. 
ITS technologies offer options for far more powerful tracking and 
communication of the status of trains throughout a rail network. Using digital 
computing and signal technologies to acquire and transmit such knowledge lends 
itself to connection with other information and control systems required for safe 
grade crossing operation. 
Direct vision has been the train operator's only tool for checking the status of 
each crossing as the train approaches. ITS technologies provide monitoring of the 
true conditions at crossings. Technologies as familiar as loop detectors and as new 
and rapidly developing as video detection and Doppler radar are being used or 
show promise for monitoring crossing status. Again, computer analysis, 
communications, and control possibilities allow this acquisition of crossing status 
to fit into a complete system of safe crossing operation. 24 
In principal, the correct responses to a potential conflict are quite 
straightforward. If a train is approaching, vehicles in the crossing must clear it and 
no other vehicles enter. If this fails to happen, the train must stop before entering 
the crossing. A slightly more subtle but equally important issue is the handling of 
failed equipment and systems. If the condition of either the train or crossing 
equipment is compromised, a set of actions must be initiated to assure continued 
safety at the crossing through the completion of repairs. 
What is simple in principal is more difficult and/or expensive when the stakes 
are high and those responsible are ordinary human beings. In any grade crossing 
accident, the likelihood of death for those in a car or truck is very great. When 
considering high speed passenger rail, the possibility of a collision leading to 
derailment and disaster is very real. Acceptable operation of high speed rail 
requires complete compliance with safe practice by both train crews and motor 
vehicle drivers at all crossings. Timely and accurate information can improve the 
consistency and appropriateness of human responses. Dependably accurate 
information is also critical to acceptance of positive controls which prevent human 
errors, e.g. automatic brake control for trains and fully closing crossing gates for 
road vehicles. Consistent enforcement of regulations also can create an expectation 
of compliance and apparently a stronger disincentive to violation than the thought 
of merely killing oneself and hundreds of others. ITS technologies combined with 
both traditional and newer crossing barrier designs can create effective controls to 
assure safe responses to potential conflicts at road-rail crossings. 
5.2  Train Control 
The traditional approaches to knowing train status cannot provide precise 
information about location and speed, but have still worked very well at providing 
safe and reasonably efficient train control and crossing warnings. However, as train 
speeds are increased, and so also the range of speeds from train to train, more 
detailed information is needed for operations that will be safe, efficient, and 
acceptable to the public. In the United States and in other countries, new train 25 
control and railroad management systems have been proposed and/or are being 
used. In some instances these are directly tied to grade crossings. In others, the 
technologies have been developed for train control, but can be extended to 
incorporate crossings into the train control system. 
5.2.1  MOVING BLOCKS 
A more constant and detailed knowledge of train location and speed is highly 
desirable for many aspects of railroad management and can provide opportunities 
for optimized control of grade crossings. With the ability to exchange detailed 
information afforded by digital technologies, the concept of a "moving block" 
becomes central. Rather than a fixed section of track, blocks are thought of as 
buffer zones that exist before and behind a train. The block moves with the train. 
For this to work, control systems must know the location and movement of the 
train. The relatively simple wayside-only systems used for ABS are replaced by on­
board computers in two-way communication with wayside and/or central 
computers. Moving blocks provide the closest possible safe headways. Systems to 
implement this concept exist and are seeing wider use throughout Europe and the 
United States. 
5.2.2  ATCS/ARES/PTC 
In the United States and Canada, standards have been adopted for advanced 
train control systems (ATCS). The full standard offers excellent opportunities to 
apply advanced technologies to the problem of grade crossing safety. But the 
railroads have adopted a piecemeal approach to implementation, as costs could be 
justified. A scaled down form of the most safety critical systems, positive train 
control (PTC), is also only finding a home on the most congested corridors. 
Though newer technologies are in some cases overrunning ATCS before it is even 
tried, study of how ATCS subsystems could connect with grade crossing 26 
equipment provides a useful model for further development of the newer 
technologies. 
5.2.2.1 ATCS/ARES 
The ATCS standards have been developed jointly by the Association of 
American Railroads (AAR) and the Railway Association of Canada (RAC). ATCS 
uses mobile data radio to convey information. As originally conceived, ATCS uses 
wayside transponders to reset the train odometer. A closely related project 
conducted by Burlington NorthernAdvanced Railroad Electronics System 
(ARES)used a global positioning system (GPS) to constantly track and report 
train location. 
ATCS is grounded on the principles of open, nonproprietary system 
architecture and system-wide interoperability. The system is intended to remain 
open to technical innovation and to allow engines from any railroad to operate in 
full compliance with the system on any other railroad. The communications 
network adopts the International Standards Organization's Open Systems 
Interconnect model (Bartoskewitz and Richards 1995, pg.3). ATCS calls for 
communications to use the six channels in the 900 MHz (UHF) band allocated in 
the United States and Canada for railroad communication. The ARES project used 
VHF frequencies. VHF allows for greater distances between base stations. UHF may 
be less affected by RF interference in congested areas (Railroad Communications 
1994, pg.44). Wayside-to-cab and cab-to-wayside digital communications link 
trains to dispatch, track control devices (e.g. switches), and maintenance-of-way 
forces. 
Many subsystems comprise the full ATCS. Those most directly related to safety 
are often spoken of under the titles Positive Train Separation (PTS) or Positive 
Train Control (PTC). Other components of the ATCS standard also have important, 
though less direct, safety implications, e.g. work order reporting and real-time 
communication of track warrants to maintenance-of-way forces. 27 
ATCS has five major elements: the central dispatch computer, the locomotive 
on-board computer, the track forces terminal, the wayside interface unit, and the 
communications system which connects all of these. Mobile data radio is the 
carrier for most of the information exchange which comprises the system, though 
wayside units may also connect to the dispatch computer by telephone lines or 
fiber optic links (Poltorak 1991). The communications and control standards of 
ATCS lend themselves to more sophisticated grade crossing systems. 
Within the ATCS, the work vehicle system may provide a starting point for a 
request-based opening of a crossing. The system consists of three components: the 
mobile communications package, the track forces terminal, and a display. Though 
it is used for a variety of communications and control needs for track work gangs, 
of primary interest here is the ability of the system to request, secure, and release 
track occupancy authority (Poltorak 1991). A similar system could be used at 
crossings to control authority to open a gate and cross the track. Authorities are 
granted by the central dispatch computer only if they can be safely accommodated. 
This can be done without any requirement for human response, though human 
intervention is always possible. Once the authority is in place, all of the automatic 
safeguards of the system are in force to assure that no approaching train will enter 
the occupied trackin this case the crossing occupied by the vehicle on the road. 
This corresponds to the German approach to private crossingsa presumption that 
an open gate means an occupied crossing. 
ATCS field devices also provide useful models for components of a road-rail 
crossing. Controllable devices include those which interrupt a route. 
Noncontrollable devices include intrusion detectors and various integrity 
indicators (Poltorak 1991). The opening of a crossing can be thought of as an 
interruption to a routea train cannot be permitted to enter an open crossing 
anymore than it can be permitted to reach a wrongly set switch. Intrusion detectors 
would include any of the possible ways of detecting the presence of vehicles in a 
crossing, e.g. loops or automatic video interpretation. Integrity indicators can be 
monitored to determine the good working order of the crossing systems and 
automatically impose appropriate safety restrictions on approaching trains as well 28 
as initiating notification of repair and safety crews. Within the ATCS protocols, all 
field devices along a route must confirm safe conditions before track authority is 
granted for a train. 
5.2.2.2 PTS/PTC 
Positive train separation is the narrower of these two terms. It refers, essentially, 
to a train-train collision avoidance capability. Positive train control is broader and 
includes the ability to enforce speed restrictions, both permanent and temporary. 
The ATCS approach to PTC would provide constant monitoring of train position, 
estimated braking distance, speed restrictions, and track warrants. Minimum 
headways and maximum overall speeds are achieved through moving block 
signaling. A more conventional approach to PTC is being implemented in the 
Northeast Corridor (NEC). 
5.2.2.3 PTC ON THE NORTHEAST CORRIDOR 
Under a conventional TCS, Automatic Train Control (ATC) and Automatic 
Train Stop (ATS) carry out some of the functions of FTC without the moving block 
capabilities. Currently, 10,000 km (6,212 mi.) of United States railroad is equipped 
with ATS or ATC. (Railroad Communications 1994, pg.37). In intermittent systems, 
the ATS/ATC responds to signal beacons at critical control points. Continuous 
systems interface with the track circuits. On the north end of the NECBoston to 
New HavenAmtrak is upgrading the line from the current four aspect signal 
system to a nine aspect system. This is being done through extension of the existing 
coded track circuits. The single frequency, 3-code system is being upgraded to a two 
frequency, 8-code system. Automatic cab signals are used. The additional aspects 
and other upgrades will allow increased overall speeds, enforcement of civil 
engineering speed restrictions, and positive train stop at key control points. The 
train stop capability is an intermittent system. The system is designed for speeds up 
to 240 kph (150 mph) (Railroad Communications  1994, pg.47f). 29 
5.2.2.4 THE FUTURE OF ATCS/PTC 
ATCS/PTC could provide critical knowledge and opportunity for advanced 
crossing control. Train location and speed are accurately known. Communication 
and control links among trains, dispatch, and all devices along the route could 
include crossing treatment components. Unfortunately, the future of ATCS is far 
from clear. Key advantages, for instance the detailed information needed for 
moving block signaling, are seen as expensive and difficult to justify outside of 
congested areas. Newer technologies are being applied to specific problems met by 
various ATCS components, e.g. cellular phone data communication for work order 
reporting. Of particular interest is the continuing research into GPS based PTC 
systems and their application to grade crossings. The Union Pacific Railroad is 
currently working toward a test installation of a GPS/PTC activated grade crossing 
system. They are particularly interested in the potential to provide sophisticated 
control without expensive extensions to track control circuit systems. AAR is 
showing flexibility in looking at alternate data paths, e.g. VHF, cellular. 
Consideration of how best to assure highway-rail crossing safety must look at the 
full spectrum of options available and cannot assume ATCS technologies on HSR 
corridors. 
5.2.3  TRAIN-TYPE TRANSPONDER-SWEDEN 
One of the simplest, yet most useful pieces of information needed is the ability 
to distinguish between slower freight and higher speed passenger trains. The 
Swedish State Railway uses an activation beacon which recognizes the distinct 
signal from a high speed trainset onboard transponder and activates the crossing 
warnings and gates early enough to clear the crossing. When a slower freight passes 
the beacon, the crossing gate activation is delayed appropriately to minimize 
disruption of normal traffic. The Swedish system also follows the activation beacon 
with a check beacon located at the minimum distance required for a full service 
brake to stop a high speed train before the crossing (High Speed 1994). It is 
interesting to note that the Connecticut Department of Transportation's proposal 30 
for a crossing following Swedish principles apparently does not include 
distinguishing train speeds. They feel four-quadrant gates will be sufficient to 
ensure compliance even from anxious motorists dealing with advance warning 
times of up to 150 seconds (Leete, R. 1994). 
5.2.4  CATC GERMANY 
The German Railway (Deutsche Bahn, DB) developed its high speed rail 
signaling system initially for trains running up to 190 kph (120 mph) on existing 
lines. It is now used for Intercity-Express (ICE) trains in Germany and other 
European countries running up to 280 kph (175 mph). The system combines 
continuous automatic train control (CATC) along with associated on-board 
automatic speed control (ASC), decentralized microcomputer interlockings for 
safeguarding routes, and operation control center automatic train supervision. 
Signaling is through an inductive loop laid between the tracks. The CATC accounts 
for schedule, train speed and braking curves, and terrain while always maintaining 
train protection. Redundant computers in a 2 of 2 or 2 of 3 agreement protocol are 
used throughout the system. Trains can travel at nearly the shortest possible 
moving block headways. 
On sections of the DB equipped for high speed operation, data are transmitted 
between the train and wayside and central controllers by means of an induction 
loop located within the gage of the track. The induction loop is built with 
crossovers at fixed distances. These are detected by the train passing over and used 
to reset the on-board odometer. The odometer and speedometer are constantly 
polled by the on-board computer and the information also relayed via the 
induction loop to the other elements of the CATC system (Hummer 1991). This 
induction loop/crossover system is also used by Vancouver, B.C.'s Skytrain rapid 
transit system. 31 
5.3  Vehide Location and Data Mapping 
5.3.1  GEOGRAPHIC INFORMATION SYSTEMS 
A Geographic Information System (GIS) has been developed to better follow 
and understand rail-highway crossing safety data (Faghri 1995). This system is 
intended for analysis of data collected over a period of time. GIS are also finding 
application in real-time situations in the dispatch of emergency vehicles. A GIS 
lends itself to integrating data relevant to grade crossing management in a dynamic 
and powerful tool. Train location on the line can be shown, with colors coding for 
important information such as speed, class of train, and current block authority. 
Intrusion detection devices can give a running count of traffic volume on the cross 
street as well as flashing a blocked crossing condition. Over time significant data 
can be gathered about driver behavior at particular crossings. Having all of this 
gathered in one GIS may provide unprecedented power for understanding and 
managing crossings. Real-time vehicle location data, from GPS or other automatic 
vehicle location systems (AVL) along with traffic data from loop detectors and/or 
video image processing/detection systems are increasingly being pulled together as 
layers on top of GIS maps showing streets, rail lines, construction, and utilities. 
Incorporating train status, especially at and near highway-rail crossings, could 
provide a valuable tool for coordination and optimizing responses of emergency 
vehicles. 
5.3.2  AUTOMATIC VEHICLE LOCATION 
Automatic vehicle location systems are seeing increased use for transit and 
emergency vehicles. The systems are parallel to those discussed for train control 
systems. Seeking common standards may hold promise for crossing safety, 
especially for the safety of critical tripsbuses, hazardous materials, and 
emergency vehicles. 32 
In some instances, transponders on vehicles are recognized by roadside or in-
the-roadbed beacons/detectors. These roadside stations report the vehicle location 
to a central control station, often feeding directly into a GIS representation of the 
area. The beacons may also report their, fixed, location to an on-board computer as 
an aid for traveler navigation or schedule compliance. This parallels the ATCS train 
location standard. 
In other systems, vehicles locate themselves by means of a Global Positioning 
System (GPS). Analysis of signals received from several satellites allows on board 
calculation of vehicle location. Again, the information can be used for vehicle 
navigation systems. Digital data radio can be used to exchange vehicle location 
information with a central control center as needed. This parallels the use of GPS 
in the ARES project. 
5.4  Traveler Information and Warning 
5.4.1  AUTOMATIC WHISTLES 
Various options have been explored or can be contemplated for improving 
motorists' ability to recognize the approach of a train to a crossing. On the 
simplest end, the John A. Volpe National Transportation Systems Center (VNTSC) 
is doing FRA sponsored research on audible warning devices installed directly at 
crossings as a substitute for traditional train whistles. Some field testing of an 
Automated Horn System (AHS) mounted at a crossing has been done at the City of 
Gering, Nebraska (Rail-Highway 1994, pg 15). 
5.4.2  VEHICLE PROXIMITY ALERTING SYSTEM 
It has been suggested that the Vehicle Proximity Alerting System (VPAS) being 
developed by FHWA has the potential to interface with ATCS (Railroad 
Communications 1994, pg.vii). Such a system is particularly intended for vehicles 33 
carrying critical loads. This has appeal in light of research indicating that requiring 
buses and hazardous material transporters to stop at crossings with active warnings 
when the warnings are not activated significantly increases accidents with trains 
(Bowman et al. 1986). The VPAS could be seen as an acceptable alternative to the 
heightened visual and auditory checking which is supposed to occur when critical 
load vehicles stop at all crossings. 
5.4.3  CONSTANT WARNING TIME 
Constant warning time (CWT) track circuits were developed in the sixties and 
are installed at over 6,000 crossings in the United States (Bowman et al. 1986). 
They have been found to be effective in reducing warning device violations by 
motorists (Halkias & Eck 1985, Bowman 1987). It is not clear what factor is most 
importantthe elimination of long waits for slow trains, or the consistency of 
warning which increases motorist trust in the warning. 
A GPS based PTC system could provide the needed information to eliminate 
long waits and/or provide motorists with trustworthy information about 
approaching trains, e.g. through variable message signs. ITS highway monitoring 
technologies could provide another low-cost alternative to conventional track 
circuit or to ATCS-based knowledge of train location and speed for the activation of 
crossing warnings and protective barriers. Video and Doppler radar based vehicle 
detection systems could be turned up the tracks to detect and report train progress 
toward a crossing. These will be discussed at greater length in later sections. 
5.4.4  TRAVELER INFORMATION SYSTEMS 
Traveler Information Systems (TIS) are being developed and tested as means of 
aiding navigation and giving real-time information, as for example directing traffic 
away from congested streets. The information may come to the motorist through 
on-board data terminals or graphical displays. It may be presented from fixed 34 
locations through variable message signs or through local travel information radio 
signals. 
5.4.4.1 ON-BOARD 
Real-time, in-vehicle traveler information systems being developed as part of 
ITS could pick-up information about on-coming trains and provide a warning. As 
an example of how such a system might work, consider the Comprehensive 
Automobile Control System (CACS) research sponsored by Japan's Ministry of 
International Trade and Industry. In this system, vehicles send an ID and a 
destination code to a loop at each intersection. The intersection returns turning 
directions based on route, but also on real-time traffic information (Yumoto 1995, 
pg.111). Such a location keyed system could be expanded in a straightforward way 
to check if a route crosses a rail line and if a train is coming it could provide 
additional warning or alternate routing to a grade separated crossing. The vehicle 
IDs could also be used to warn train crews of critical vehicle types approaching the 
crossing. 
Taking this one step further, the GIS/GPS in-vehicle navigation/travel 
optimization systems now being developed could initiate exchange of data about 
train status from railroad systems. Through mobile data terminals, driversor the 
computer system directlycould query the train control system about how long a 
given crossing will be open before the next train approach. Emergency vehicles 
could have codes to send out a pre-emption signal to a given crossing and receive 
back confirmation that an approaching train is braking to allow the emergency 
vehicle to pass through the necessary crossing without danger of collision. 
5.4.4.2 ROADSIDE 
Excessive delay can lead anxious motorists to non-compliance with highway-
rail crossing warning devices. Rozek and Harrison state that motorists find any 
delay greater than 50 seconds "annoying and troublesome" (Rozek and Harrison 35 
1988, pg.51). Leete suggests the industry standard has been belief that "warning 
times in excess of 40 seconds would encourage an anxious motorist to drive 
around a downed gate" (Leete, 1994). It is our belief that driver uncertainty is a 
primary factor in increased non-compliance with longer delays. With ITS 
technologies it is possible to give waiting motorists real-time updates on how long 
they will have to wait. A variable message sign can be tied into the system to count 
down the remaining time until the expected arrival of the train. If a full ATCS is 
implemented, information about train length would also be present in the system 
and the message could indicate the amount of time left until the crossing will open 
again. Figure 5.1 shows a sample of a repeating, updating sequence of messages on 
a variable message sign. A separate fixed sign could direct drivers to the nearest 
grade-separated crossings in either direction along the track. In the event of a 
trapped vehicle, the variable message sign could be used to assure and caution 
other motorists (Figure 5.2). In addition to visual information through a variable 
message sign, the same information could be provided audibly through a leaky 
coaxial cable broadcast along the approaches to the crossing. A permanent sign 
would direct motorists to tune to the proper frequency for train information. 
5.5  Incident Detection 
Incident detection systems may simply note the presence or absence of a 
vehicle in the area they cover. They may be designed to sound alerts based on 
stopped vehicles. They may track a wide range of sophisticated traffic properties, 
noting not only stopped, but also slowed vehicles, as well as speed, distance, and 
headways of approaching vehicles. Systems may be automatic, human monitored, 
or automatic with information based on inferences from other systems. Incident 
detection has focused on detecting motor vehicles, but monitoring train status 
approaching crossings may also be an appropriate use of these technologies. 36 
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Figure 5.1  Repeating, updating sequence on variable message sign. 37 
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Figure 5.2  VMS use as part of trapped vehicle response. 
5.5.1  MONITORED GATES 
On the German Federal Railway, rail crossings are regulated by the Eisenbahn 
Bau- and Betriebsordnung (EBO). Low volume, private crossing status is controlled 
by gates tied into the block signaling system. An open gate is presumed to indicate 
an occupied crossing and a closed gate to indicate that the crossing is clear (Bauer 
1995, EBO 1992). The Action Plan recommends such a linking of normally closed 
gates into the signal system for private crossings of lines operating from 177 to 200 
kph, though it also calls for separate intrusion detection as a fail safe. 
5.5.2  CROSSING TELEPHONES 
Telephones located at crossings provide direct communication with train 
dispatchers controlling the rail line. In the United Kingdom, there are 4,500 private 
crossings in England. Of these, 1200 are controlled with telephones. At these 
private crossings, the motorist telephones the control signalman before and after 
crossing. The control signaler sets a restrictive aspect on the block with the 
crossing, then clears it after the second call. If the second call is forgotten, the train 
must proceed with caution and report the crossing status to the signaler. Some 38 
blocks in England are 32 km (20 mi) longa crossing in use anywhere in this 
length restricts the use of the whole block (Hunter-Zaworski 1995). 
In this country, the enormous growth in cellular phone use may warrant 
placing of permanent signs at crossing indicating a number that can be dialed for 
operations in connection with the crossing. An extension given with the number 
could automatically identify the crossing to the human or computer monitor 
receiving the call. Whether by cellular or conventional lines, calls might be used as 
in Britain, for crossing clearance. Telephones also could be used to report 
problems, or to retrieve train status or alternate route information. 
5.5.3  VIDEO MONITORING 
Direct, human monitoring of crossing status by video can provide a redundant 
level of safety and a check on the correct functioning of automatic systems. Video 
monitoring can be by train operators in-cab as they approach a crossing, or in the 
central dispatch office, or in a separate locationcreated specifically to monitor 
crossing safety or as part of a larger transportation management center. 
5.5.3.1 VIDEO MONITORING AND MANUAL CROSSING CONTROL 
In the United Kingdom, semi-manual operation of crossings is more common 
than fully automatic systems. Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) shows the signaler 
each crossing as needed. The screen for a given crossing remains blank until a train 
approaches. The train signal is restrictive until the signaler has manually lowered 
the barrier (our standard gate type) or swung the gate (older style gate that swings 
across tracks to open roadway). Half barriers or staggered operation of four 
quadrant gates allow motorist escape. Once the signaler has determined that the 
crossing is clear, he or she changes the signal and the train can proceed at speeds 
up to 200 kph (125 mph). When the train passes the crossing, the gates open 
automatically. 39 
5.5.3.2 IN-CAB VIDEO 
In -cab video monitoring of grade crossings has been demonstrated by Wireless 
Technologies, Inc. in cooperation with the New York State DOT at the Lincoln 
Avenue crossing on Conrail's Chicago Line, Albany Division. Wireless Technologies 
is a Los Angeles based manufacturer of radio frequency (RF) video transmission 
systems. They installed Autoscope video detection equipment and a radio 
transmitter directed up the line. Beginning slightly over four miles up the track, the 
on-board receiver they installed picked up the signal and displayed live video of 
the crossing in the cab of the train as it approached at speeds up to 160 kph (100 
mph). Figure 5.3 shows a typical sensor coverage for the system. The display also 
included a rectangular area superimposed over the crossing image which changed 
color to indicate that the Autoscope system had detected a vehicle present (Grade 
Crossing Safety 1995). 
Rozek and Harrison indicated that "on train closed-circuit television" is used to 
assure crossing safety of French and British trains with grade crossings at 200 kph 
(125 mph) (Rozek 1988 pg.49). 
Odetics, also a California company, has developed Fastrans to send 
compressed video over phone lines. One version available transmits video over 
cellular phone lines. This system is currently being used to monitor variable 
message signs in the San Fernando Valley (Purdom, N. 1995, pg.82). Cellular 
phone lines have been used in other train-based systems, so it is reasonable to 
consider this a possible alternative transmission mode for live video of crossings 
into the cab of approaching trains, as well as to dispatch or another monitoring 
center. 40 
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Figure 5.3  Camera coverage for in-cab crossing video. 
5.5.4  AUTOMATIC DETECTION SYSTEMS 
5.5.4.1 INDUCTIVE LOOP 
Swedish Railways use loop detectors in the crossing to check for the presence of 
vehicles during a gate-down sequence. Their four-quadrant gates are configured to 
close approaches but leave open exit lanes as long as vehicles are detected in the 41 
crossing. The loops also report crossing status to the wayside check beacon located 
at the safe stopping distance for approaching trains (High Speed 1994). Loop 
detectors have also been used in Los Angeles to trigger cameras for crossing 
enforcement. 
In the past, inductive loop detectors have had high failure rates/maintenance 
needs. The most common causes of failure were improper installation, inadequate 
sealants, or wire failure (Bikowitz 1985). Careful installation and maintenance can 
minimize problems, but problem experience and the fixed, inflexible nature of 
loop installations has propelled investigation of alternatives. 
5.5.4.2 VIDEO IMAGE PROCESSING 
Another approach to vehicle detection is automatic video interpretation. In 
contrast to inductive loops, which detect the presence of a vehicle at a particular 
spot, video detection systems are Wide Area Detection Systems (WADS) capable of 
monitoring vehicles activity in multiple or extended areas from each camera angle. 
Flexibility is a key advantage of video detection systems. Different systems offer 
varied features and options: stopped vehicle detection, remote or on-sight control 
and redefinition of detection zones for each camera, and live video return over 
coaxial cable, fiber optic cable, conventional phone, or cellular phone lines 
(Larson, T. 1995). 
Autoscope is the trade name of the video imaging package most widely used in 
the United States. The VIS feeds video images of the crossing from permanently 
mounted cameras to a computer. The computer software analyzes the image and in 
real-time recognizes the presence of a vehicle in user-defined zones. Such a system 
is called "loop emulation." In addition to its principal use in street/highway 
applications, the Autoscope system has seen use in Los Angeles as an alternate 
trigger for photographing highway-rail crossing violations (Bartoskewitz & 
Richards 1995, pgs 10-11). It has also been included as part of a system which 
transmits live video of a crossing directly to the cab of an approaching train. 42 
Beyond loop-emulation systems, video detection systems capable of tracking 
individual vehicles are being developed and installed. In Spain, one WADS that 
detects and tracks vehicles over an extended area, as opposed to multiple defined 
detection zones, is the Estacion de Vision Artificial (EVA)artificial vision station. 
This is a far more complex problem. The added complexity yields benefits in a 
traffic management setting by generating richer data than loop emulation systems. 
The processing power required also makes video compression and transmission 
practical. Image quality trades off against refresh rate, the product of these two 
being a constant determined by the bandwidth of the particular transmission 
mode (Rodriguez and Marzan 1995). The added information from such a tracking 
system probably is not critical to potential use for monitoring crossing status. 
Comparisons of video quality and transfer rate with other video detection systems 
might be worthwhile. 
Comparisons of reliability of detection over the range of lighting and weather 
conditions would also be helpful. New companies and expanded capabilities are 
entering the field, each making strong claims. A recent addition in the United 
States is PEAK systems. Their software, like the EVA, tracks individual vehicles. Lane 
County in Oregon currently has one Autoscope controlled intersection but is 
installing a PEAK system at a second intersection. Their experience may be very 
helpful in developing comparisons. 
About 450 Autoscope systems are in the field. The current, 4th generation 
Autoscope usually sells in four-camera units for about $4-5,000 per camera. About 
400 EVA units from Eliop Trafico are being installed around Madrid. A unit for a 
single camera (without the camera) costs $8,000. A two-camera unit with high-
speed image compression costs $18,500 (Purdom 1995, pg. 85). 
5.5.4.3 DOPPLER RADAR 
Video detection systems offer flexibility and wide area coverage, but they can 
be affected by changes in lighting and by heavy rain, snow, or fog. Doppler radar 
may offer longer range and greatly reduced sensitivity to changing environmental 43 
factors. THOMPSON-CSF working with SAPRR (Societe de Autoroute Paris-Rhin-
Rhone) has done preliminary development and study of radar based traffic 
incident detection. The system could analyze both directions of traffic, detecting 
stopped or slowed vehicles in a range of 100 to 1000 meters. The reported precision 
was speed reported ± 2 kph and range reported ± 15 m (Lion and Rousel 1995). 
Though developed for motor vehicle detection, the characteristics of this system 
suggest it might be most useful in crossing safety as a system for monitoring 
approaching trains. Rather than constant activation, conventional track circuits 
could notify the radar system of a train approaching its detection zone. Speed and 
distance information from the radar could provide information for constant 
warning time crossing control. With acceptably conservative assumptions about 
braking efficiency, the radar could also be used to recognize the decision point for 
an approaching trainthe point at which an occupied crossing would require a 
FSB command be sent to the train. 
5.6  Control and Enforcement 
5.6.1  EDUCATION AND ENFORCEMENT 
Operation Lifesaver is a public education program first introduced in Florida. 
It deals with educating the public on how to approach and cross grade crossings 
and also what actions to take if things go wrong. It is now a nationwide program 
and according to the program officials it has significantly helped in reducing grade 
crossing accidents 
In addition to public education, enforcement is an important part of creating a 
community sense that one always heeds crossing warnings. Operation Lifesaver 
includes education for law enforcement personnel on their important role in 
increasing crossing safety. 
Enforcement is also enhanced by photographing, and subsequent ticketing of 
those who violate crossing warnings. Los Angeles has experimented with both loop 44 
and video detectors to trigger a photograph if a vehicle is detected in the crossing 
once the warning gates are down. 
5.6.2  REDUNDANCY 
If a vehicle is present in a crossing, an approaching train must stop before 
entering the crossing. Because neither automatic equipment nor human operators 
are completely reliable, redundancy is necessary. Appropriate combinations of 
human and automatic monitoring and control are needed for each crossing. For 
instance, a video image processing detection system might notify the ATCS of a 
crossing intrusion. This would trigger a warning to the train operator and, failing a 
response, would then lead to automatic braking. If the video image were also being 
fed to a human monitor, it would be possible to override the automatic systems if 
the detection proved a false alarm. The human monitor might be the train 
operator, with in-cab video, or the dispatcher, or in a special corridor-safety office 
created to work with the train operator and dispatcher in this role. Anecdotal 
information strongly suggests that train operators will find ways to disable 
automatic equipment if they do not have faith in it. Having an official channel to 
deal with faulty readings may help in the full acceptance of extending automatic 
control to crossing safety. 
5.6.3  MEDIAN BARRIERS 
Another approach to compliance is simply to make non-compliance physically 
harder. The two-quadrant gatesstandard in the United Statesleave open a path 
around them. Median barriers at highway-rail crossings separate the approach and 
exit lanes. Thus, if a standard half gate is used to close the approach lane, it is 
difficult to cross over into the exit lane to go around the gate. This approach 
discourages defeating warning gates while always leaving exit lanes unblocked. To 
be effective, the median barriers must extend well back from the crossing. To be 
safe, they must comply with sound design standards for islands and barriers in 45 
streets and highways. Islands, providing a standard curb-height barrier, are not safe 
at speeds above 55 kph (35 mph). Full barriers suitable for higher speed require 
appropriate shy distance in adjacent lanes, shock absorbing and/or deflecting end 
treatments, and appropriate signing. 
5.6.4  FOUR QUAD GATES 
Four quadrant gates fully block the approaches and exits from a crossing. 
Resistance to four quad gates has centered on the possibility of trapping a vehicle 
in a crossing. Koester describes the shift away from four quad gates in the United 
States (Koester 1995). As late as the 1950s, four quadrant gates were common at 
crossings operated manually by gate tenders. To save costs, railroads began to 
automate these crossings. Broken exit gates were common and modifying the delay 
timing of exit gates was not fully satisfactory. Eventually, exit gates were removed 
uniformly. ITS detection systems can meet the trapped-motorist concern. In 
Sweden loop detectors keep open the exit paths until a crossing is cleared and 
further notify an approaching train of an occupied crossing in time for a safe stop. 
British Rail guards against trapped vehicles with video surveillance of crossings. 
Intrusion detection components of an ATCS can automatically brake an 
approaching train if a vehicle is detected in the crossing. 
5.6.5  NORMALLY CLOSED GATES 
At very low volume crossings, and especially private crossings, the best 
arrangement may be to keep crossings closed except when a vehicle requests and is 
granted authority to open the crossing gate. This is the approach taken by the DB. 
Though certainly more awkward than a normally open crossing, this arrangement 
can offer benefits which may appeal to private crossing owners, principally a gain 
in control over access to their property. 
Consider how this might work. Let the request-for-crossing authority 
procedure include a changeable electronic access code (punched in by phone or 46 
perhaps with an at-crossing keypad)in the manner of a home security unit. If 
automatic phone technology is used for the communication link, the roadside unit 
could include a button to call the owner (home, shopany number or no number 
might be programmed by the owner). A touch-tone could then allow the owner to 
remotely authorize a crossing request. Railroad and emergency personnel would, of 
course, always possess working keys to the crossing. 
5.6.6  TRAFFIC CALMING 
Intelligent transportation systems should be systems. Along with the electronics, 
the more fundamental realities, such as crossing geometry, need to support and 
augment crossing safety. Speed and inattention are factors in crossing accidents. 
Various roadway alignment and construction designs, collectively known under the 
heading of "traffic calming" designs are being used to lower motorist speeds and 
heighten awareness at critical junctures. It is worth exploring the possibility of 
using such designs to improve highway-rail crossing safety. 
The highway-rail crossing is already a mentally demanding situation for 
motorist perception and reaction. Any traffic calming design would have to achieve 
its purpose without adding to the perception reaction burden of the motorist. The 
goal would be to increase the time available for response to a crossing through the 
lowering of approach speeds. 
Another possible use of knowledge gained in traffic calming would be the 
design of traffic flow diverters which would bring an overspeed vehicle into a safe, 
fixed barrier. Normal traffic would be slowed to turn away from the barrier and 
then proceed to the crossing. Again, constructing a system that is entirely clear to 
drivers is critical to the safety and success of such a plan. 47 
5.6.7  CROSSING RELIABILITY MONITORING 
Increasing use of sophisticated crossing technologies creates greater 
dependence on the constant, reliable functioning of these systems. Automatic 
monitoring of crossing health may be a key element in maintaining that reliability. 
The following discussion is based on that of Bartoskewitz and Richards 
(Bartoskewitz & Richards 1995, pg8). 
Railroad maintenance forces must wisely use available labor and budget 
resources; they are often spread thin. Damaged or defective crossing equipment 
may be reported by train crews or motorists. Dispatchers relay this information to 
the appropriate signal maintainer for action. The system is somewhat haphazard 
and may leave defective equipment undetected and unrepaired for significant 
lengths of time. To meet these problems, several railroads are investigating 
automatic crossing monitoring. 
One proposal uses cellular phone and computer calling technology to respond 
to malfunctions detected by sensors at the crossing. The unit might be 
programmed to notify appropriate authorities, both railroad dispatch and local 
police, as well as calling on the maintenance forces for service. A Canadian railroad 
is testing a system in which crossing monitors are linked to a central computer. The 
computer constantly polls the crossings to determine their operability. Any 
malfunctions are identified and reported. 
5.6.8  VEHICLE ARRESTING BARRIERS 
At train speeds above 175 kph, crossings must fully protect rail movements. 
The tasks required at lower speeds remain: driver warning and information, 
intrusion detection, and physically blocking the crossing. At these higher speeds, 
however, protecting the train is essential. Physically blocking the entrance to the 
crossing must be done with some form of barrier capable of stopping any vehicle 
likely to hit it. Such a barrier may be of an energy-absorbing design or of a rigid, 
non-forgiving type. 48 
5.6.8.1 "FRIENDLY" BARRIERS 
Considerable effort is going into design of impact attenuation barriers which 
can be deployed at highway-rail crossings. In some cases these are seen as 
acceptable alternatives where grade separation would be called for but landuse and 
geometrics make it impossible. In such higher volume applications, the likelihood 
of serious injuries to motorists may justify higher costs, at least up to those of a 
standard grade separation. 
Some designs use a net which drops down or swings in (Figure 5.4). The net is 
tied to a visco-elastic shock absorbing system. Such a system may present its own 
geometric problems. A fixed dragnet system designed to stop a 2,045 kg (4500 lb) 
passenger car impacting at 100 kph (60 mph) requires about 21.3 m (70 ft) of 
deflection to decelerate the car at no more than 2 g's (Roadside 1989, pg.8-17). 
Figure 5.5 shows minimum stopping distance (deflection) as a function of impact 
speed for three idealized constant deceleration systems at 2, 4, and 6 g's. In actual 
systems, deceleration is not constant. Deceleration curves for real systems are 
strongly dependent on vehicle mass and system geometry. 
Figure 5.4  Dragnet crossing barrier. 49 
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Figure 5.5  Constant deceleration stopping distance curves. 
In other systems, impact attenuation drums roll into place on low dollies. 
Other systems deploy an energy absorbing wall up from the roadway. All of these 
systems are designed to protect both the train and the motorist. The protection of 
wayward motorists, something not afforded by standard crossings today, must be 
balanced against initial and ongoing costs, deployment time, and turn-around 
redeployment time and cost following an incident. 
5.6.8.2 RIGID BARRIERS 
Using a rigid barrier system would more closely match current expectations for 
driver safety. Conventional warning signs, passive and active, would precede the 
barrier. Drivers failing to heed the warnings would hit the barrier with no more 
protection than they would have hitting a train if the barrier were not there. But the 
train would be protected. Principal types of rigid barriers are high security 50 
barricade and high security bollard designs, each of which can withstand great 
impacts and continue normal functioning, and crash-rated beam barriers which 
offer less absolute security but some degree of forgiveness to the impacting 
motorist (Figure 5.6). 
a) 
b) 
c) 
Figure 5.6  Rigid barriers: a) barricade; b) bollard; c) cable-beam 51 
Crash-rated beam barriers come in two basic forms: vertical lift arms and 
horizontal gates, which may be rolling, swing, or cantilever. The vertical arm design 
is much like a conventional warning gate, except that when closed the tip of the 
gate and its incorporated aircraft cable is locked into a far-side anchor post. This 
design is available for spans of up to 7.6 m (25 ft). The horizontal gate completely 
blocks an opening, to both vehicles and pedestrians. This design can span greater 
openings; for maximum width, two gates can lock to each other. 
Crash-rated beam barriers may be quite adequate for grade protection 
applications where very high speed approaches are unlikely. A typical rating would 
certify the barrier to stop a 2,700 kg (6,000 lb) vehicle impacting at 55 kph (35 
mph). This would be quite appropriate for many small town or village crossings 
and in more open country if the road geometry forced a speed reduction prior to 
reaching the crossing. They are widely used at movable bridge approaches. 
Anecdotal information also suggests their forgivenesscorrespondence from B&B 
Electromagnetic recounts: 
Only a few years ago, the police radioed to a bridge equipped with our TB­
7200 barriers to have the barrier closed to stop a vehicle involved in a high 
speed chase. The vehicle was an old Cadillac. The driver deliberately 
attempted to crash through the barrier at a high rate of speed (reported to 
us as in excess of 60 or 70 mph). He was stopped without injury (Mobile 
Barrier 1994). 
5.6.8.3 WARNING AND REGULATORY CONSIDERATIONS 
Use of a rigid barrier would require careful attention to warning signage. 
Drivers must recognize a deadly hazard even when a train is not in sight. In 
addition to railroad crossings, other instances where roads are intermittently 
interrupted by deadly hazards include movable bridges and ferry crossings. 
Typically all of these protect drivers only with warning devices, not energy 
absorbing systems. Signage for these other instances may offer guidance for rail 
crossings protected by rigid barriers (cf MUTCD 1988 4E-1,5-6,13-17). Approval 
for use of rigid barriers at HSR crossings should be sought at the highest level 52 
possibleeither by enactment of legislation or by decision of the appropriate state 
transportation commission. 
5.6.8.4 BARRIERS AS ELEMENTS OF CROSSING SYSTEMS 
As any gate or barrier is being evaluated for use on high speed rail corridors 
and in conjunction with ITS monitoring and control functions, several design 
parameters should be investigated: 
Does the gate/barrier fully close the roadway? At what maximum and 
minimum widths? 
Will the barrier prevent an impacting vehicle from jumping over? 
What sophistication of control is possible (e.g. can escape segments be 
separately opened and closed or is it all or nothing deployment)? 
How quickly can the system go from undeployed to deployed and vice versa? 
Crash behavior. What is the arresting capacity? Is it energy absorbing? If so, 
with what level of deflection? 
Does the system include or lend itself to built-in status detectors able to 
report operability and any problems in operation? Can it avoid hitting a car 
during deployment? 
5.6.9  TRANSPORTATION/GRADE-CROSSING CONTROL CENTER 
Central dispatch centers in the United States may be monitoring and 
controlling hundreds or even thousands of miles of track. Adding responsibilities 
for highway-rail grade crossings may overburden the present system. CCTV 
monitoring of grade crossings and human oversight of warning and protective 53 
devices may better be done at a more local, corridor specific level. Such a center 
might be based on the model of Traffic Management Centers now being used to 
control signal timing, variable message signs, emergency response, and other 
congestion reduction measures in large urban areas. 
A grade crossing control center would serve as a meeting ground for control of 
the surface transportation modes. Both rail and highway traffic concerns would be 
focused on the intersection of these two modes at crossings. Control could be local 
enough to provide familiarity with the characteristics and peculiarities of 
individual crossings. 
Such a center, operating as a redundant backup or as a primary control agent, 
would need means to perform all three of the fundamental tasks of grade crossing 
safety. Train status might reach the center through links to an ATCS system, or from 
Doppler radar looking up-track from each crossing. Crossing status could be 
monitored through CCTV with or without VIP automatic detection systems. The 
center could be given override control of four quadrant gates/barriers to allow 
escape of trapped vehicles. 
Stopping a train when a vehicle is stalled or stuck presents a more difficult set 
of options. If the center were acting as a backup, and recognized a false alarm, a 
call to the dispatcher would be sufficient to set in motion the override of automatic 
train stop systems, allowing the train to proceed through the crossing. But in the 
event of an actual stopped vehicle in the crossing, time would not allow going 
through another link in the chainthe dispatcher. The simplest system would give 
the center a direct line to the train control system allowing them to place the most 
restrictive aspect on the block containing the crossing. For HSR, such a change in 
aspect would trigger an audible warning tone and change the cab signals and/or 
engage the automatic train stop. An alternate approach would be to create a 
separate communication channel from the center to any train on the track 
approaching the crossing, to activate a separate in-cab warning system. The cab 
warning system could have its own tie-in to an ATS. This would have the potential 
disadvantage of cluttering the cab and presenting one more stimulus which train 
crews would have to learn to respond to. It might have the advantage of directness, 54 
and the rarity of use (as distinct from the standard acknowledgment-required tone) 
might reduce any tendency to become inattentively reflexive in responsepossibly 
failing to register the seriousness of the warning. 55 
6. CROSSING CLASSIFICATIONS 
An understanding of the types of low volume crossings is the first step in 
designing appropriate treatments. Crossings in the Oregon HSR corridor range 
from dirt footpaths intersecting the rail line to grade-separated freeway crossings. 
Of the approximately 237 crossings, 49 are already grade-separated and the 
remaining 188 are at-grade. Of these 188, 118 are publicincluding 6 pedestrian 
crossings. Seventy are privateincluding three pedestrian crossings. In this report 
we are concerned only with the low-volume crossingsthose with annual average 
daily traffic (AADT) of 200 or fewer vehicles. Twenty-two public crossings are low-
volume. All of the 70 private crossings are assumed to fall into this category. 
Many intrinsic and extrinsic qualities can be used to classify the low volume 
crossings in the Oregon HSR corridor. Among the variables are: crossing 
ownership, surrounding landuse, operational characteristics of crossings, and 
crossing user groups. Considering the effects on safety and economics offers a way 
to winnow the many variables down to a reasonable set of characteristics used to 
assign appropriate treatments to crossings. 
6.1  Ownership/Control 
The Oregon Legislature extended PUC authority to all crossings on the HSR 
corridor, private as well as public (Senate Bill 713, 1993). This transportation 
function of the PUC has now been transferred to ODOT. Though under one 
authority, the ways crossing safety improvements will be developed and 
maintained will vary depending on ownership of the crossing right. 
6.1.1  PUBLIC 
Public crossings must be designed to a higher standard than may be necessary 
for private crossings. At best, users can be expected to have no better than average 56 
comprehension of grade crossing safety in general. Nor can they be expected to 
have knowledge of any specific crossing in particular. Higher type designs 
compensate for lack of control over who uses the crossings. Sixteen public low 
volume roads and six public pedestrian ways cross the Oregon HSR corridor at 
grade. 
6.1.2  PRIVATE 
Private crossings may exist by agreement, without agreement, or by deed right. 
Sixty-seven vehicle and three pedestrian private ways cross the Oregon HSR 
corridor. (The following discussion of private crossings is based on Hemmely, 
1994). 
6.1.2.1  AGREEMENT 
Agreement crossings exist where the railroad and a private party have entered 
into a contract permitting the private landowner to establish a private crossing. 
These agreements are revocable by the railroad on 30 days notice. Presumably, 
quality of the crossing and who would pay for improvements would be a matter of 
negotiation between owners and the railroad once minimum safety standards are 
met. About 25 crossings in the corridor are agreement crossings. 
6.1.2.2  NON-AGREEMENT 
As the name suggests, non-agreement crossing have been established by private 
landowners without permission from the railroad. In such instances, it is the right 
and duty of the railroad to defend its property rights against such open claims of 
competing rights. The Southern Pacific in the Willamette Valley has been reluctant 
to pursue closing of these irregular crossings. Approximately 36 private crossings 
exist without contractual agreement. In a third of these cases, the crossings have 
been in existence for more than ten years. This open use by adjacent landowners 57 
for ten or more years may well meet the requirements to establish a prescriptive 
easement. These landowners' rights of use could be removed only by agreement or 
condemnationwith just compensation. Negotiations on improvements to any 
non-agreement crossing may need to start with regularizing the crossing in one way 
or anotherby agreement or court action. Again, this is first an issue between 
private parties. 
6.1.2.3 PERPETUAL RIGHT 
In four cases, property owners have deeded access to the railroad for its right-
of-way with the stipulation that the owner can establish a crossing lasting into 
perpetuity as a property right. Here the property owners have the strongest hand in 
dealing with the railroadbut as with all private crossings the issues are first 
between private parties. The state, through ODOT, should only step in with its 
power of condemnation as a last resort if needed to create a safe HSR corridor. 
6.2  Land-use Access 
Public crossings may be categorized by their surroundings as urban, small 
town, or rural. Private crossings may have more particular and limited uses. 
6.2.1  PUBLIC 
Urban, small town, and rural settings affect driver expectancy and behavior. 
The settings may also create differing constraints on alternate access and emergency 
services. Many urban, small town, and rural effects will be reflected in other factors, 
e.g. density of crossings and AADT. 58 
6.2.2  PRIVATE 
A rough breakdown of private crossing uses in the Oregon HSR corridor is 
given in Table 6.1. Different uses make different demands. Agricultural crossings 
may be field access needed only at a few times during the year but the crossing may 
need to accommodate a tractor pulling a harrow. Residences/farm driveways may 
have few or many daily trips depending on the family and/or the farm operation. 
Businesses crossings may serve primarily employees, or they may be quasi-public 
crossings for a retail operation. Figure 6.1 shows how these uses are distributed 
along the corridor. 
Table 6.1  Count of private crossings by landuse type. 
Crossing Type  Count 
Agricultural Crossing  26 
Residence/Farm Drive  24 
Industrial  12 
RR Yard  5 
Fire  1 
Pedestrian  2 
Total  70 
6.3  Crossing Geometry and Traffic 
Crossing geometry and traffic, both train and highway, provide primary 
measures of crossing operation. 
6.3.1  NUMBER OF TRACKS 
Multiple tracks present a particular hazard when a stopped or slow moving 
train on a near track blocks motorists' view of another train on a farther track. Five 59 
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Figure 6.1  Distribution of private crossings by landuse type. 
of the sixteen low volume public road crossings have multiple tracks. All of the 
private crossings are over single tracks, though some may be near divisions to 
double track. 
6.3.2  NUMBER OF TRAINS 
The greater the number of trains the greater the risk exposure. Some switch 
engine traffic increases the number of trains in the urban areas of the corridor, but 
the low volume crossings all have essentially the same number of trains. Currently 
16 to 20 trains daily use the SP mainline down the valley. Merger with the Union 
Pacific and a trend toward smaller freight trains might significantly increase this 
number in addition to any added passenger trains. At whatever level, the number 
of trains is likely to remain consistent from one crossing to another through the 
length of the corridor. 60 
6.3.3  AADT 
Highway traffic is the other direct risk exposure factormore vehicles present 
more opportunities for accidents. AADT also is a direct factor in figuring the delay 
caused by crossings. Higher traffic volumes require higher levels of servicevery 
low volumes may allow significantly greater levels of inconvenience at crossings. 
The 22 low volume, at-grade public crossings in the corridor include 16 roads and 
6 pedestrian only crossings. Of the 16 road crossings, 3 may be classified as 
extremely low volume with AADTs of 20 or fewer vehicles. Figure 6.2 shows the 
distribution of AADTs for the low volume public crossings. Traffic volumes are not 
at present available for private crossings. 
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Figure 6.2  Low volume public crossing counts by AADT. 61 
6.3.4  CROSSING AND APPROACH GEOMETRY 
Oblique angles increase difficulties in seeing and interpreting possible conflicts 
at crossings. High speed trains may travel twice the speed of standard freight trains 
in the corridor, requiring much longer sight distances up and down the track to 
allow adequate visual warning of train approach. Clear lines of sight as vehicles 
approach a crossing are important with passive crossing controls, but much less so 
with active control. The approach of the highway to the crossing may affect the 
speed with which a negligent driver might drive through warning gatesthis is 
important in deciding on the energy absorbing capacity of barriers where the train 
must be protected. Many of the crossings in the corridor occur where the railroad 
closely parallels Highway 99 leading to extreme vertical curves (humps) and little 
refuge space between the tracks and the main highway. 
6.3.5  CROSSING DENSITY 
The number of crossings along a given length of track is of particular interest 
when looking for relatively painless opportunities for crossing consolidation. 
Higher crossing densities may offer alternate access or suggest building a frontage 
road. 
6.3.6  TRAIN SPEED 
Though we are looking at crossings for high speed trains, some areas may be 
constrained without exceptionally high expenditures to straighten and otherwise 
improve the track. For example, the SP mainline is on a curve through the town of 
Jefferson, with a bridge at one end of the curve. Bringing trains up to the highest 
speeds here could be very costly. 62 
6.4  Users 
Passenger autos can be assumed at all crossings except those for pedestrians 
only. Trucks, buses, and farm vehicles may present special problems, requiring 
adequate widths between gate supports, acceptable vertical curvatures to prevent 
bottoming out, adequate refuge space between tracks and stop controlled 
intersections, and allowance for greater times to cross and clear tracks. Where the 
crossing is to a field used for livestock, animals must not be allowed to stray onto 
the tracks. 
Pedestrians and bicyclists present other questions. When must specific 
pedestrian treatments be employed along with vehicle related controls? Are 
bicyclists at a crossing likely to operate as vehicles, as pedestrians, or both? What is 
required by the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)? Can a wheelchair passable 
crossing still safely accommodate the dynamic envelope of a high speed train's 
wheels? These are important and largely unexplored issues, and beyond the scope 
of this report. 
6.5  Accident History 
A crossing which has once had an accident is more likely to have additional 
accidentsif nothing changes. The most significant change is an upgrading of a 
crossing from passive to active warning. More subtle, but also important changes 
may arise from changing land use in the area, changes to the highway network in 
the region of the crossing, or changes in railroad operations (e.g. scheduling, use of 
sidings). Five of the low volume public roads have recent accident history. 
6.6  Selecting Critical Design Categories 
Each grade crossing must be treated individually, but a few broad categories 
shaped from all of these variables can provide a useful starting point. Some of the 63 
information needed to place crossings in one category or another is already 
available, more will need to be gathered. 
Safety and economic factors are the core of grade crossing cost benefit analysis 
and offer a useful filter for understanding grade crossing characteristics. First it 
should be noted that the different characteristics do not all represent independent 
variables; for example, AADT for field access will be vanishingly small, for towns 
perhaps in the hundreds. 
Grade crossing accident prediction models weight different factors according to 
their effect on safety. The data these are based on in this country do not, of course, 
come from HSR operations. The maximum safety measure considered is also only 
the conventional two quadrant gate with flashing lights. Despite these limitations, 
such models are a good way to gain understanding of which factors are most 
critical in the safety performance of crossings. 
The Rail-Highway Crossing Resource Allocation Procedure is the FRA's preferred 
model for crossing safety analysis (Rail-Highway, 1986). The most important factors 
in this model are the level of crossing protection, AADT, the number of trains daily, 
and the number of tracks crossed. An additional factor uses the accident history of 
individual crossings to account for other potentially significant factors which are 
not part of the crossing database (e.g. proximity to a tavern). 
6.7  Recommended Design Categories 
A limited set of primary design categories allows focus on the principal 
crossing protection needed for each category. These primary categories are given in 
Table 6.2. Within the different categories, individual factors such as the need to 
contain livestock may further shape the crossing treatment. This set of primary 
categories forms one axis of the treatment matrix presented in the following 
chapter. 64 
Table 6.2  Primary crossing categories. 
Category	  Use  AADT  Train Speed 
Special Minimum	  private  less than one  up to 175 kph 
Basic Minimum	  private  <= 200 (assumed)  up to 175 kph 
public  up to 20  up to 175 kph 
Basic Public	  public  <= 200  up to 175 kph 
Higher Speed-Basic  private  <= 200 (assumed)  up to 200 kph 
public  up to 20  up to 200 kph 
Higher Speed-Public  public  <= 200  up to 200 kph 
These categories reflect a combination of risk factors and level of service 
requirements. In most cases these two qualities move up the scale together. 
Extremely low volume crossings present less risk, and greater inconvenience can be 
tolerated by the small number of users. Conversely, higher volumes increase risk 
and require greater attention to guidance and delays. The first three categories are 
for train speeds up to 175 kph. The latter two categories are for speeds up to 200 
kph and reflect the necessity of protecting trains from probable derailment in the 
event of an accident. 
6.7.1  SPECIAL MINIMUM 
The special minimum category is reserved for rarely used private crossings with 
no complicating safety factors. Some farm field access points may need to be 
retained, though any higher type treatment cannot be justified for the small risk 
involved. These crossings 
have tight control on who uses them, 
only need to be reached on a few days during the year, 
have excellent sight distances, and 
train speeds not higher than 175 kph. 65 
6.7.2  BASIC MINIMUM 
The basic minimum applies to all other private crossings and as a special case 
to the three extremely low volume public crossings in the corridor. Note that these 
other private crossings represent a very wide spread of characteristicsno one 
treatment will be most appropriate for all of them. But all can be placed under a 
required minimum standard. The private parties themselves will be the best judges 
of whether a higher type treatment, with a higher level of service, is justified for 
their own particular crossing. 
6.7.3  BASIC PUBLIC 
This category is for public roads where train speeds do not exceed 175 kph. As 
a public facility, level of service and very clear guidance to motorists become very 
important. 
6.7.4  HIGHER SPEED-BASIC 
This category recapitulates the Basic Minimum. In this case, the higher train 
speeds will also require treatments clearly focused on protection for the train. 
6.7.5  HIGHER SPEED-PUBLIC 
Again, this category recapitulates the Basic Public, but with the paramount 
need to protect the train. That need and the higher demands placed on public 
crossings make this category of crossings quite challenging. 66 
7. RECOMMENDED CROSSING TREATMENTS 
The following guidelines are largely in accord with and extend the 
recommendations of the FRA/FHWA Action Plan (Table 2.3). We assume that 
medium and high volume roads will be grade separated or treated in other ways 
beyond the province of this report. For all treatments, closure/consolidation or 
grade separation is the first recommendation where possible. This might be 
accomplished by providing alternate access, creating frontage roads, arranging land 
trades, or outright purchase of lands. Above 200 kph all crossings must be closed 
or grade-separated. The understanding of the types of low volume crossings 
provided in the previous chapter provides the starting point for assigning 
appropriate treatments to crossings. 
The Action Plan states the need for new approaches to private crossings: "FRA 
has traditionally taken the position that private crossing matters should be settled 
by the private parties involved. However, from a safety perspective, this approach 
has proven inadequate" (Rail-Highway 1994, pg.12). The Oregon State Legislature 
recognized the need for change and gave the Public Utility Commission the same 
authority over private crossings on the high speed rail corridor as it exercised on all 
public crossings (Senate Bill 713, 1993). As a transportation function, this 
authority has now been shifted to ODOT. 
The Action Plan also suggested a treatment: "The feasibility of placing gates 
with remotely activated cipher locks at private crossings will be investigated and 
possibly demonstrated." Such as system would require calling the dispatcher to 
enable unlocking the gate. "The gate would be interlocked with the railroad's signal 
system" (Rail-Highway 1994, pg14). 
A key element for such private crossings is that the crossing is closed by 
default, and opened only on request when safety is assured. As discussed in 
Chapter Five, a Traffic Management Center would provide an alternative to 
burdening the train dispatchers with handling crossing requests. 67 
Public crossings require a higher level of guidance, control, and convenience 
for users. Except in the case of extremely low volume crossings, public crossings 
should be open by default and close only when necessary as trains approach. Safety 
for higher speed trains will require earlier advance gate closing. 
7.1.  Primary Protection Elements 
Figure 7.1 presents a matrix of primary crossing protection elements and the 
five basic crossing categories presented in chapter six. The following section 
presents guidelines for these primary elements. Key system elements for more than 
one treatment level, e.g. use of a Traffic Management Center, are discussed where 
first encountered. 
R = Required 
speed < 175 kph  175 kph < spd < 200 kph 0 = Optional 
Categories/  Special  Basic  Basic  Higher  Higher 
Treatments  Minimum  Minimum  Public  Speed-Basic  Speed-Public 
Close Crossing  0  0  0  0  0 
Private Gate  R 
Remote Lock
 
Gate  0  R
 
Four Quad Gate  0  0  R 
Remote Lock  0 0  R Barrier 
Automatic Barrier  0  0  0  0 R 
Grade Separate  0  0  0  0  0 
Figure 7.1  Primary crossing treatment matrix. 68 
The required treatments are intended as minimum standards. Crossings which 
fit a lower risk and LOS category may, as an option, be given treatment appropriate 
to a higher demand category. For example, a business owner served by a private 
crossing might wish to treat the crossing as though it were a public crossingthe 
greater expense being justified by the greater convenience. The minimum standards 
provide a baseline for negotiations over distributing the costs of improvements 
among the state, railroad, and private land owners. Higher type treatments would 
presumably be paid for in larger measure by the party requesting the higher 
treatment. 
7.1.1.  PRIVATE GATES 
Seldom used crossings with no complicating factors do not warrant 
sophisticated and costly treatment. At the same time, use of such crossings must 
not be casual. For Special Minimum crossings, a simple, lockable gate is adequate. 
The gate may be chosen and installed by the crossing owner. It should normally be 
left locked (this could be as simple as a length of chain and a padlock). Extra keys 
should be provided to area emergency service providers and to the railroad. The 
gate should be set back at the edge of the railroad right-of-way. Users of the 
crossings must be instructed to wait if any train is in sight at any distancejudging 
train type and speed is too difficult to chance. Violations of this instruction 
repeated crossings in sight of a traincould be grounds for ODOT to require 
upgrading the crossing to the full Basic Minimum treatment. 
7.1.2  REMOTE LOCK GATES-TMC CONTROL 
Remote lock gates are the type of control mentioned in the Action Plan. The 
gate is normally locked. The lock is controlled remotely by railroad dispatch or 
from a Traffic Management Center, either by phone line or radio. The following 
treatment discussions assume a TMC, but the procedures and systems would be 
essentially the same if created as part of the railroad dispatch system. 69 
At a remote lock gate, the user must call the TMC to receive clearance to cross. 
If adequate time is available, the TMC will unlock the gate. Gates could be 
automatically raised and lowered, but in most cases will be manually operated by 
the user. It may be desirable in some locations to provide phones on either side of 
the crossing connecting directly to the TMC but the pace of cellular phone service 
availability and acceptance may make this unnecessary. Signs at each crossing will 
identify the crossing by number and give the number to dial for crossing clearance/ 
gate lock release. 
7.1.2.1 USER-SYSTEM INTERFACE 
The basic elements of a standard gate-opening request are shown in Figure 7.2. 
Normally the call will be handled automatically with a minimum of input from 
the crossing user. After dialing the TMC, the user punches in the number of the 
crossing and the four-digit security code created by the crossing owner. If adequate 
clear time is available, the gate is unlocked and the user notified to proceed. 
Otherwise, the computer will give an estimate of time until the crossing will be 
clear. Would-be users of the crossing will be able to hear a message recorded by the 
crossing owner. Staying on line will connect the user through to a human at the 
TMC. 
The owners will also be able to call a separate phone number to make changes. 
They will be able to change the recorded messages available to users. They will be 
able to change their master codes (which enable these changes) and to create new 
access codes to allow use of the crossing. In this way, a farmer could give a working 
access code to someone who needs temporary access; after they are done, the 
farmer could then remove that code. Emergency service providers and the railroad 
will have permanent access codes. 70 
(Dial TMC Automatic Gate Clearance ph#) 
\ "At any time yc  may request gate release by entering the four-digit 
request code." 
"Remember, you must close the gate immediately after crossing." 
"This is a private crossing. To request permission to cross and to 
release the gate lock, you must enter the crossing owner's four-digit 
request code." 
"To hear a message from the crossing owner, press 'one' now." 
'_'To speak with an operator, please stay on the line." 
(-A message pre-recorded 
by gate owner is played, 
returns to top of  . 
messaga_l' 
TMC gate system receives owner's master code, other 
owner authorized request code, or emergency services 
master code. 
At the TMC an alert light activates on situation board. 
"Checking for approaching trains, please wait. Remember, 
you will need to close the gate immediately after crossing." 
System checks train approaches to the crossing and 
responds accordingly: 
_./ 
7-­ "You must wait. It will not be safe to cross "Next train expected in [number]\ 
for approximately [number] minutes. minutes. You may open the gate 
Please hold on or call again after train and cross." 
passes. {[number] trains approaching; 
please hold on or call again after they 
pass.) 
Figure 7.2  Automatic gate unlock request procedure. 71 
7.1.2.2. TMC 
The TMC will be responsible for crossing safety somewhat the way air traffic 
control is responsible for safety at airports. Trains and road users both need to 
occupy the same space at a crossingthe TMC must assure that they are never both 
in that space at the same time. Most of the work will be monitoring of automatic 
systems. Train locations, velocities, and types will be constantly available from data 
links to GPS units on the locomotives. When a request for gate opening is received, 
a computer will check for approaching trains, calculate their decision points with 
respect to the requested crossing, and determine if enough clear time is available to 
allow the gate to be unlocked. 
A situation board or display will show the whole corridor. Train movement 
will be shown in real time. All crossings will be indicated as open, closed, or 
request-pending. Alerts will sound if an opened gate is not closed again within a 
reasonable time. A phone icon or indicator will display next to the crossing when a 
user holds on to speak with a human. 
The TMC operators will have phone numbers of crossing owners to call if a 
problem appears. For instance, if a gate is left open, a call to the farmhouse will 
often find someone who can contact the people working the particular field. The 
operators will also have a direct radio link to the locomotive cab. A gate not dosed 
in a timely manner would cause the computer to send a caution to approaching 
trainsrequiring them to slow before reaching the high speed decision point then 
proceed with caution at a speed based on clear sight distance to the particular 
crossing. The computer database will store and process the information needed for 
correct timings and caution approach speeds for each crossing. 
7.1.2.3 TIMING 
Current active crossing timing is based on the time needed to clear out a 
crossing once the warning device is activated. A twenty second lead time is 
intended to let vehicles in the crossing have time to get out of the crossing. The 72 
possibility of a stuck vehicle is small enough to simply accept that risk. The timing 
is not based on train braking distances. A standard freight train traveling 100 kph 
will take more than four kilometers to stopbraking for minutes rather than 
seconds. (Typical braking distances, from which braking times are calculated 
assuming constant deceleration, are from Ullman and Bing, 1995.) 
The greater risks of HSR, including the even greater difficult of accurately 
judging train approach speeds, justify crossing timings based on train braking 
distances. These are primarily a function of the train typeits mass and design 
braking capabilities, train maintenancethe actual effectiveness of all the brakes, 
and the train speed. The much lower mass of higher speed passenger train sets 
allow them to brake in much shorter distances than freight trains at any given 
speed. At 130 kph a passenger train can stop in about 43 seconds of full service 
braking. At 175 kph that rises to about 65 seconds and at 200 kph the braking time 
needed is about 76 seconds. Those are the times needed once the brakes are 
applied. Crossing clearance, communication, and reaction times must also be 
considered. 
We discuss crossing clearout times for automatic gate systems below. For a 
manually operated, remote lock gate, clearout time includes leaving the vehicle, 
opening the firstneargate, opening the secondfargate, returning to the 
vehicle, driving through, leaving the vehicle, closing the first gate, and closing the 
second gate. Time trials with a prototype will be needed, but for the moment an 
allowance of 120 seconds is reasonable. 
Communication time includes the time needed for the TMC to recognize a 
problem and send appropriate instructions to the train cab. In the case of remote 
lock gates, this is a cushion on the clearout time. The question is, how much more 
than the 120 seconds do we want to allow before a failure to detect a closed second 
gate generates an instruction for a critically close train to stop. The reactions in this 
case are all automatic, no human interpretation or actions are immediately 
required. Ten seconds is an appropriate allowance. This cushion time might also be 
customized to account for crossing peculiarities. For instance, where trains have 73 
come out of slower sections and are accelerating, a longer time would correct for 
the increasing braking time requirement as the train speeds up. 
The actual braking time, added to the clearance time, the communication/ 
adjustment time, and the standard eight seconds in-cab reaction time totals to the 
clear time needed to unlock the gates. For a train approaching at 175 kph, this 
would total to about three and one quarter minutes. If all goes well, a critically 
close train would actually pass by in less time than this, as it would not be slowing 
to a stop. The TMC calculations for a gate release request are as follows: 
1) Using signals from the GPS/PTC system, locate the trains nearest the crossing 
approaching from each direction. Get the train type and speed. The 
following steps apply to each train (a closer train in one direction may be 
slower; the farther train in the other direction might be the critical case.) 
2)Calculate the actual braking distance required for a full service stop, based 
on train type, speed, and an assumed brake derating (Ullman and Bing used 
a 25 percent derating, which may be high). This distance out from the 
crossing is the train decision point at which full service braking must begin 
to stop the train before it enters the crossing. 
3)Multiply train speed by the clearout, communication/adjustment, and 
reaction time allowances to find the distance the train will travel during 
crossing use. 
4)Add this travel distance to the train decision point distance. If the train is at 
or closer than this distance, deny the gate release request. 
5)If all trains are a safe distance away, permit the crossing; unlock the gates. 
6)Monitor train position and speed, updating train decision point. If train 
reaches decision point and both gates are not closed, signal cab for full 
service braking. 74 
7) If clearout and communication times have passed without both gates closed, 
approaching trains not yet at a critical point may be instructed to slow before 
reaching their current-speed decision point. Based on crossing specific sight 
distance data, the computer will instruct the train to slow to a speed at which 
the crossing can be clearly seen eight seconds back from the train decision 
point for the slower speed. Automatic train control would greatly aid this 
process. 
8)When both gates are closed, the TMC signals the train to continue at normal 
speed. 
7.1.3  FOUR QUAD GATES-INTRUSION DETECTION 
Basic Public crossings should be treated with four quadrant gates. These are 
simply conventional railroad crossing warning gates, but arranged to completely 
block access to the crossing. They are dimensioned, painted, and have descent rates 
as specified for crossing gates in the MUTCD. Four quad gates prevent impatient 
drivers from slipping around by crossing over into opposing lanes. Intrusion 
detectors will prevent trapping vehicles in the crossing. 
Timing of the gates will differ from conventional in two aspects. The activation 
of the crossing gates will be based on train braking as discussed above. The closing 
of the second set of gatesthose blocking the exits from the crossing, will be 
delayed and can be prevented if a vehicle is still in the crossing. 
7.1.3.1 ACTIVATION TIMING 
Activation timing of four quad gates is based on the same motivation as 
discussed above for remote lock gatesclearance is given to occupy the crossing to 
road users or trains, but not both at the same time. To allow road users in the 
crossing when a train has passed the point at which it could stop before the 
crossing would violate this principle. Train decision points will be calculated for 75 
four quad gates in the same way. The question of clearance and communication/ 
adjustment times is, "How early must we activate the gates to assure that the 
crossing is clear before the train reaches the decision point plus reaction distance?" 
The current standard for crossing clear out time is 20 seconds. This has been 
questioned by MacDonald (1995). He points out that the timing of crossings is 
based on a California standard established in 1927. Much larger trucks operate 
now and, at crawl speeds, they may require more than 20 seconds to clear a 
crossing. Quad crossings will have intrusion detectors (discussed below), allowing 
notice to trains to slow if necessary. Basing activation on train braking time also 
gives a much larger safety margin than conventional timing. However, it is also 
critical to the success of passenger rail that it operate on time, that it not experience 
unanticipated slowing because a crossing is not cleared out in the anticipated time. 
Given this need, extending the clearout time to 25 seconds is reasonable. CFR 49 
Parts 234.223 and 234.225 set minimum times. 
Adjustment/communication time for quad gates may be zero. As a normally 
open crossing, public or quasi-public in nature, and fully automatic in operation, 
extra time need only be built in to account for individual crossing peculiarities. As 
above, changing train speeds approaching the crossing will continually change the 
actual train decision pointadjustment time can allow for that. 
A train approaching at 175 kph with a full service brake stop distance of about 
1.5 km would cover that distance in 30 seconds at speed. The gates in this case 
would need to come down: 30 seconds travel time from the decision point, plus 25 
seconds clearout time, plus 8 seconds reaction timea total of 63 seconds before 
the train arrives at the crossing. The actual passing of the train would only take a 
few seconds. This lead time before the train arrives is much longer than current 
practice. Three things contribute to its acceptability: 
1) this treatment is for low volume roads; 
2) it is enforcedthe closed exit gates will prevent impatient motorists from 
driving around gates and through the crossing; 76 
3) motorists will be informedvariable message signs (discussed below) will 
let them understand that the long delay is not a malfunction. 
The gate activation point, then, is the distance to the computed train decision 
point, plus the travel distance of the clearout time, reaction time, and any 
adjustment/communication time. The control sequence is: 
1) When a train passes its gate activation point for a particular crossing, that 
gate activation sequence begins. The status display in the TMC shows this 
and subsequent changes. 
2)The train speed is monitored and the train decision point continually 
updated. If the train reaches its reaction pointeight seconds travel from the 
current-speed decision point, and all gates are not closed, a full service brake 
instruction is sent. 
3)When the all-gate-closed signal reaches the TMC, the train is instructed to 
resume normal operations. 
4)When the TMC detects (from GPS system) that the train has passed the 
crossing, the gates all open at the same time. 
7.1.3.2 INTRUSION DETECTION 
The main objection to four quad gates has been the fear of trapping vehicles in 
the crossing. Intrusion detection will remove this problem. Gate activation will 
start with lowering the gates which block the approach lanes. In normal 
circumstances, the gates which block the crossing exit lanes will begin to lower 
only once the approach gates are fully down. If a vehicle is detected still in the 
crossing, the approach gates remain down but the exit gate for the occupied lane 
does not descend until the vehicle is clear of the crossing. Detector status will be 
relayed to the TMC responsible for the safety and control of the crossing. 77 
Video image processing, inductive loop, infrared, or sonar detectors could be 
used for intrusion detection. Inductive loops must be designed to operate reliably 
in the electrically active area around the tracks. Infrared and sonar detection would 
not have this problem, but as far as we know have not yet been tried for train 
crossing detection. None of these technologies give more information than 
presence or absence of intrusion. Video image processing has been used for 
intrusion detection for photo enforcement (Bartoskewitz and Richards, 1995). It 
also has the advantage of placing cameras at the crossing which could be used for 
human monitoring of crossing status. Such monitoring is not required as part of 
this treatment for Basic Public crossings, but would be necessary if train speeds are 
to be further upgraded. Using video at this stage can be thought of as an 
incremental approach toward the second stage of higher speed rail. 
7.1.4  REMOTE LOCK BARRIER-PROTECTING THE TRAIN 
Higher Speed-Basic crossings will operate in the same way as Basic Minimum 
crossings, but with a definite focus on protecting the train from any collision. 
Barriers will take the place of gates. The Action Plan identifies 110 mph (175 kph) as 
the speed above which a collision is likely to cause a derailment. We have not been 
able to locate any study upon which this is based. All of our treatments for HSR 
crossings are based on avoiding any collisions. The treatments described in the 
previous sections are based on excellent information and moderate enforcement. 
For speeds above 175 kph, additional enforcement will prevent accidental or 
willful recklessness from endangering the train at crossings. 
A barrier, in this case, is just a type of gate designed to contain a crash of given 
energy within a known deflection. In other words, if a vehicle hits it, it will bend 
but not break. For most private crossings, a relatively simple cable-reinforced gate 
will be adequate. The gate contains one or more lengths of aircraft arresting 
cablethe kind used to stop jets on landing on carriers. It is hung on a solid 
anchor and when closed locks to another solid anchor. The arrangement is such 
that the ends of the cable are locked to the solid anchors on each side when the 78 
barrier is closed. Such gates do have some give when struck, but they cannot be 
considered friendly. Barrier design needs to stop the vehicle, neither letting it cut 
under or jump over. The width of the barrier would depend on the needs of the 
particular crossing ownersome agricultural implements may require a 24 foot 
clear opening. 
In some instances a still more formidable barrier may be called for. See Section 
5.6.8 above for descriptions of various barriers and Section 7.1.5.1 below for a 
decision criterion. Timing and operation are the same as for the remote lock gate. 
7.1.5  AUTOMATIC BARRIER-VIDEO MONITORING 
The highest treatment type for low volume roads combines barriers to protect 
train movement with an additional layer of checks against trapping vehicles. As 
with four quad gates, crossing status will show in the TMC. For these Higher Speed-
Public crossings, a video image of the crossing will also come up at the TMC when 
the gate and barrier system is activated. 
7.1.5.1 BARRIER /WARNING GATE ARRANGEMENT 
At this level, with significant, public-use volumes, barriers cannot be used as 
their own warning. The public is used to relatively flimsy gates at crossings, which 
they do at times drive through. Barriers themselves will need warning gates. 
The distances out from the tracks will depend on the type of barrier used. A 
highly rigid barrier, e.g. steel and concrete bollards, can stop a small truck with 
virtually no deflection. "Friendly" barriers, ones capable of decelerating a vehicle at 
only a few gees, have much larger deflectionson the order of 20 m. Crash-rated 
cable barriers as described above fall somewhere in between. The space available 
may be one key factor in choosing a barrier type. The other key question is, "How 
much energy might hit the barrier?" How large a vehicle at what speed must be 
expected when planning adequate protection for the train? A useful approach 79 
would be to survey the traffic type and speed at each crossing. Estimates of vehicle 
mass would allow generating a set of energy levels on the approach to the crossing. 
The 80th percentile energy level could then be used to set the protection needed 
for the crossing. 
Whatever type of barrier is selected, it will block the full width of the roadway. 
The warning gates before the barrier can be standard, approach lane, gates. Signage 
will indicate the barrier as well as the tracks which it is protecting. 
7.1.5.2  TIMING 
Timing for the automatic barrier system will be essentially the same as for four 
quad gates. The barriers fit into the pattern in the same place as the escape lane 
gates. At activation, the lights flash, the warning gates come down, and the 
intrusion detection system waits for the crossing to clear. Once clear, the barriers 
are deployed. This allows the all-gates-closed signal that allows the train to proceed 
through the crossing. 
The gate activation point again is the distance to the computed train decision 
point, plus the travel distance of the clearout time, reaction time, and any 
adjustment/communication time. Clearout time will likely be longerthe crossing 
is stretched out over a greater distance and some barrier types may take longer to 
deploy than a simple gate lowering. It will have to be calculated as part of each 
crossing design. Again, variable message signs will reduce public anxiety over the 
long crossing closure lead time. 
7.1.5.3  VIDEO MONITORING 
In addition to intrusion detection, the crossing will be watched by human 
operators at the TMC. Activation of the gate/barrier system will bring up the 
crossing video image on a monitor at the TMC. Intrusions which prevent clearout 
in the allowed time will add visual and audible alert signals to the display. The 80 
same automatic systems as for four quad gates will signal full service braking to the 
train if needed. The TMC will be able to advise the train crew and override any 
automatic systems if it is dear that a false detection is the problem. The TMC will 
also have direct input to variable message signs and audible message systems at the 
crossing. The video signal from the crossing could also be sent directly to the cab of 
approaching locomotives. 
7.2  Other Treatment System Elements 
Many support elements are required for information, guidance, and control at 
crossings. Some of these are conventional, well defined, and familiar. Others are 
newer and still evolving. 
7.2.1  STANDARD ELEMENTS 
Standard crossing elements are based in statutes and the MUTCD and are 
already incorporated in crossings serving normal freight and passenger trains. 
7.2.1.1 STOP SIGN 
ORS 763.130 requires stop signs at all private railroad crossings, unless such a 
stop sign would itself create a greater safety hazard. Stop signs will still be 
appropriate for Special and Basic Minimum and Higher Speed-Basic treatments. A 
closed gate is cause to stop. At crossings where Basic Public and Higher Speed-
Public treatments are used, stop signs are not appropriate. 
7.2.1.2 ADVANCE WARNING SIGN 
Advance warning signs are traditional yellow diamond warning signs with a 
pictogram of a railroad. An advance warning sign specifically for HSR crossings is 81 
currently under consideration by MUTCD. Advance warning signs are appropriate 
for all public crossings. Private crossings not visible from an adequate distance also 
require advance warning signs. 
7.2.1.3 PAVEMENT MARKINGS 
Standard pavement markings as set forth in the MUTCD are appropriate for all 
treatment categories wherever the approach is paved. 
7.2.1.4 FLASHING LIGHTS 
Flashing lights are required for Basic Public and Higher Speed-Public 
treatments. Their function and design are set forth in the MUTCD. Note that for 
Higher Speed-Public crossings, the flashing lights are part of the advance warning 
gate system. They are timed in respect to those gates and placed with them, not at 
the barrier itself. 
7.2.2  ADDITIONAL ELEMENTS 
High speed rail is new to this country. These crossing treatments for HSR are 
also new. Information systems at the crossing will be one critical part of educating 
motorists and helping them use the crossings easily, comfortably, and safely. 
Special circumstances may also call for particular design elements for control. 
7.2.2.1 TMC CONTACT SIGNS 
Every remaining at-grade crossing should be clearly identified with a unique 
crossing number. With that identifier should be instructions and the number to 
call the TMC to report any problems. At crossings requiring phone clearance, 
instructions and the TMC automatic phone system number should be posted. 82 
7.2.2.2  VARIABLE MESSAGE SIGN 
Variable message signs have proven useful in reducing anxiety about long 
waits. They are also used to direct traffic to alternate routes and to advise people in 
emergency situations. All of these applications potentially come into play at HSR 
crossings. A default crossing alert will normally be displayed. At activation, the sign 
can direct all to stay clear of tracks and advise motorists of when the train will pass. 
The sign could rotate through a set of messages: when the train will arrive, "Train 
Cannot Stop Before Crossing!" and direction to the nearest grade-separated 
crossing. The VMS would always be available to the TMC personnel, for instance to 
display "Help is on the way." 
7.2.2.3  AUDIBLE MESSAGE 
At pedestrian crossings, this might be a speaker. For motorists a leaky coax 
could transmit a signal to car radios at a frequency indicated on informational 
signs at the crossing. The information would be essentially the same as that given 
by a variable message sign. 
7.2.2.4  GATES/BARRIERS AS FENCE ELEMENTS 
Particular fields may be fenced to contain livestock; sections of the HSR 
corridor may be fenced to reduce trespassing. Where the line is fenced, crossings 
must not present gaps in the protection. Cattle guards before the crossing may 
serve in some instances. Gates and barriers for private crossings are available in 
designs appropriate for containing livestock and/or excluding pedestrians. Public 
crossings, normally left open, present a different problem. One solution would be 
to use a gate/barrier which swings horizontally to block either the track or the 
road. This has been a standard crossing gate type in other countries. Normally the 
gate would cross the tracks from one fenceline to the other, parallel to the roadway. 
At activation, this part of the system would swing round, probably with the end 83 
rolling on a quarter circle track, to block the road and allow passage of the train. 
Barriers of this design are in use on the approaches to movable bridges. 
7.2.2.5 PEDESTRIAN GATES 
Pedestrian treatments lie beyond the scope of this report. Pedestrians must be 
considered at in-town street railroad crossings as well as at specifically pedestrian 
crossings. The requirements of the ADA for railroad crossings are not dear. 
Creating an at-grade crossing that can safely accommodate wheelchair cross traffic 
and the dynamic envelope of higher speed train traffic may be difficult or 
impossiblewheelchairs need narrow gaps by the rails, but train wheels' flanges 
do not stay tight up against the rail under the severe dynamic loadings of high 
speed operation. Yet pedestrians, walking or in a wheelchair, regularly ignore over 
and underpasses provided for them. The perceived safety value of the grade 
separation doesn't balance the perceived effort of going up and over. Short of grade 
separated pedestrian crossings, some form of warning gate blocking a sidewalk may 
be called for. In areas where the line is fully fenced an equivalent fence gate may be 
needed. This area needs more research. 84 
8. PRELIMINARY BENEFIT/COST INFORMATION 
A full benefit/cost ratio (BCR) analysis for any element of a transportation 
system must necessarily be quite complex. And, at best, cost/benefit analyses can 
only make explicit the assumptions and values which would lead to particular 
decisions. An analysis of the multitude of scenarios which flow from the 
implementation of the technologies suggested above is beyond the scope of this 
report. The information presented in this section, therefore, is intended only to 
give a feeling for the scale and for the key factors. 
8.1  Benefit/Cost Ratio Limitations 
The core of a BCR analysis for crossing improvements contains terms for the 
capital and operations costs of improvements balanced against anticipated 
reductions in deaths, injuries, and property damage. Changes in delay, costs of 
disrupted operations, and social disruptions are also important, though difficult to 
measure or predict. BCRs often present difficulties: 
future costs and the future value of money must be guessed at; 
loss of life and limb can be assigned a great range of valuesat least an 
order of magnitude; 
the public response to low probability-high risk events, such as train 
accidents, is different from the response to more common, lesser risks 
presenting equal total exposure. 
A detailed BCR analysis for high speed rail in Oregon faces additional 
difficulties: 
models for crossing accident prediction incorporate terms for accident 
history. Such terms depend on conditions being fairly stable through the 85 
accident history period and into the future. We cannot justify such an 
assumption for the Willamette Valley, which is undergoing tremendous 
population growth; 
on the SP mainline being considered for higher speed operations, almost all 
public crossings already have gates and lightsaccidents are rare and so very 
few data are available to assess severity; 
we do not have the needed data to use prediction formulas on private 
crossings. 
8.2  Accident frequency, severity, and costs 
Research done for VOLPE presents estimates of accidents and the potential 
reductions based on crossing improvements (Ullman & Bing 1995). This analysis is 
based on data from mixed freight and passenger rail lines from the FRA Railroad 
Accident/Incident Reporting System (RAIRS) for the years 1986 to mid-1993. For a 
hypothetical 500 km (310 mile) corridor with 24 one-way trips/day on weekdays 
and 20 one-way trips/day on weekends and holidays they project 13.0 grade 
crossing collisions per year resulting in 5.0 injuries and 1.3 fatalities. 
Ullman and Bing point to the lack of data available to ascertain the increased 
severity of accidents with increased train speed. As a very rough starting point, they 
suggest that severity can be thought of as proportional to the energy dissipated in 
an accidentroughly proportional to the square of the speed. Using this approach, 
they estimate reductions in the number of accidents which would be required at 
various speeds to maintain the same overall casualties (Table 8.1). 
Considering offsetting factors, they suggest "overall, a reduction in accident 
frequency of the order of 30-40% may be desirable for speeds of 175 kph, and 50­
70% for speeds exceeding 200 kph." (Ullman & Bing 1995 pg.24). One difficulty 
with assigning increased severity in proportion to the square of the speed is that it 86 
Table 8.1  Accident reductions required for higher speeds. 
Speed, kph (mph)  Reduction in accidents 
145 (90)  23% 
175 (110)  48% 
200 (125)  60% 
72% 240 (150) 
may not adequately reflect the sharp increase in severity when train speeds are high 
enough to expect derailment following from a grade crossing collision. 
The FRA has standard values which it applies to compare the benefits of 
avoiding casualties among different regulatory scenarios. "$ 20,000 is the value 
used by FRA to represent the amount society would be willing to pay to avoid an 
average injury to a railroad employee. FRA uses $2.6 million as the amount society 
is willing to pay to avoid a fatality to a railroad employee." (Railroad 
Communications 1994 pg.58). One way of thinking about these numbers is that 
every fatality prevented pays for the cost of a grade separationif one uses these 
values for the BCR. 
Cost figures based on casualties alone do not include property damage, loss of 
lading, wreck clearance, or environmental cleanup. In lower speed collisions, 
involving the destruction of a motor vehicle with relatively minor damage to train 
equipment, lading, and operations, casualty costs likely would be most important, 
and be limited to the occupants of the motor vehicle. At higher speeds, derailment 
becomes much more likely with a resulting sharp increase in casualty, property, 
and incidental damages. 87 
8.3  Benefit, in reduced casualties, of reduced accidents 
Taking the freight/passenger corridor accident figures from Ullman and Bing 
and the casualty costs used by the FRA, one can calculate a current acceptable 
accident cost per km per year of $ 6,960: 
[ (5.0 injuries/yr * $20,000) + (1.3 fatalities/yr * $2.6m)] / 500 km = $ 6,960 /km/yr 
Over a period of 20 years, this yields acceptable accident costs of just under 
$140,000 per km. This figure is based only on the costs of casualties from grade 
crossing accidents. Calculating acceptable costs per length of track is also only one 
approach; an accident cost per passenger per kilometer could also be used. 
To maintain a positive BCR, spending for crossing safety should be in 
proportion to the resulting reduction in accident severity. Using the figure above as 
a starting place, an accident reduction of 30% would have a benefit ofwould 
justify expendingabout $42,000 per km for 20 yr improvements. An accident 
reduction of 50% would justify $70,000. 
In a typical rural section of the Willamette Valley 1010 HSR corridor in Oregon, 
where trains would be expected to run at their highest speeds, crossings average 
one per 1.5 km. Continuing with the numbers above, accident reductions of 50% 
would justify spending an average of $105,000 per crossing, again based only on 
costs of casualties and with the assumptions given above. 
Detailed crossing information is available for the public, low volume crossings 
on the Oregon HSR corridor. Oregon's accident prediction formula yields an 
average predicted accident rate of 0.20 per five years for these crossings. Assuming 
the ratio of injuries to fatalities and the costs to society given above, the average 
accident cost comes to about $275,000 if all accidents resulted in only one injury 
or fatality. Over 20 years, the 0.8 predicted accidents per crossing would represent 
$220,000 per crossing. An accident reduction of 50% would justify spending of 
$110,000 per crossingwell in line with the numbers above. 88 
8.4  Costs and accident reduction potential of treatments 
Costs for various crossing treatments are among many economic 
considerations presented in the TRB Special Report on high speed surface 
transportation options (In Pursuit 1991). The following figures are used (derived 
from tables pgs 143ff): 
Full Grade Separation  $ 1,903,200 
Crossing Elimination  $ 52,000 
Four Quadrant Warning Gates  $ 81,120 
Beyond warning systems, vehicle arresting barriers are needed to protect trains 
operating at higher speeds. Costs for "rigid" barrier systems range from manually 
operated crash-rated cable beam gatesabout $15,000 plus installation for two 25 
foot gatesup to automatic very heavy duty barricades at about $70-$100,000 to 
block a two lane road in both directions. A ballpark figure given for a dragnet 
system is about $75, 000, presumably per side (Mobile Barrier 1994). These costs 
do not include the need for a conventional warning system prior to the arresting 
barrier. 
Stalled vehicle detectors are estimated to reduce accidents by 19 percent, while 
four quadrant gates would reduce accidents by 57 percent (Ullman & Bing 1995). 
Crossing elimination and grade separation are each ways of virtually 
eliminating crossing accidents. Crossing elimination is not inexpensive, but it more 
than meets that cost with the benefit of accident reduction. The same cannot be 
said of full grade separations. Additional grade separations along a corridor must 
be partially justified by eliminating delay costs of at-grade crossings. 
Accident reductions attributable to traveler information systems, in-cab 
crossing video, vehicle arresting barriers, and combinations of these and other 
technologies can only be speculated on with present experience. Nonetheless, it 
appears likely that the costs and benefits of ITS technologies to improve crossing 
safety will be of the same order of magnitude. 89 
9. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
 
Many jurisdictions favor an incremental approach to high speed rail. Dramatic 
improvements in highway-railroad crossing safety are required to operate trains in 
the incremental speed range-130-200 kphwhile maintaining current overall 
safety of operations. Current and emerging ITS technologies can provide these 
needed safety improvements. While this research has been driven by the needs of 
high speed rail, crossing safety is already a major concern for conventional rail 
operations. The systems identified for improving HSR low volume crossing safety 
have the potential of much wider application. 
The potential of some technologies may be almost immediately realized with 
presently available equipment. Other systems are in development or depend for 
greater effect on large scale capital improvements and coordination of approach 
among railroads. As examples: four quadrant gates with intrusion detection to keep 
open exit gates until all vehicles are clear exist in Sweden; video systems to monitor 
crossings are used in Britain; combining video monitoring and video image 
processing intrusion detection for crossings is about in the proving stage in this 
country. Coded track circuits currently can provide multiple levels of response to 
conditions ahead on the track, in principle including crossing status. Crossing 
control based on more sophisticated, GPS based train information and control is 
approaching prototype testing. Tying together train and crossing status with an in-
vehicle GPS/GIS traveler information system will depend on such TISs first finding 
greater development and wider general use. 
Here in Oregon, further research is now needed to gather more complete data 
on private crossings and to develop and conduct field tests and pilot programs for 
HSR-low volume road crossing improvements. Potential sites for field tests need to 
be identified. Beyond isolated field tests, the low frequency of crossing incidents 
and the importance of driver expectancy to behavior may justify more extensive, 
multi-crossing pilot programs along significant lengths of a corridor. 
Parallel to this research, four other areas of needed high speed rail research 
bear on highway-rail crossing design. A specific crossing issue is maintenance. Low 90 
volume gravel-surfaced roads present particular concerns for the integrity and 
function of both the track and crossing safety devices. Another issue with potential 
to strongly influence gate and/or barrier design is the question of fencing. If the 
railway must be fully fenced off, crossings controls must also function as part of 
the fencing system. Intrusions by pedestrians, by livestock or pets, and by wildlife 
all present their own sets of problems. The whole question of ADA appropriate 
pedestrian treatments needs study. Finally, study of likely derailment behavior of 
high speed trainsets may give more precise guidance to the need for higher type 
treatments at grade crossings. 91 
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GLOSSARY OF TRANSPORTATION ACRONYMS 
AAR  Association of American Railroads 
ABS  Automatic Block Signals 
ACS  Automatic Cab Signals 
AHS  Automated Horn System 
ARES  Advanced Railroad Electronics System 
ASC  Automatic Speed Control 
ATC  Automatic Train Control 
ATCS  Advanced Train Control System 
ATS  Automatic Train Stop 
AVL  Automatic Vehicle Location 
CACS  Comprehensive Automobile Control System 
CATC  Continuous Automatic Train Control 
CCTV  Closed-Circuit Television 
CTC  Centralized Traffic Control 
CWT  Constant Warning Time 
DB  Deutsche Bahn (German National Railway) 
DOT  Department of Transportation 
EBO  Eisenbahn Bau- and Betriebsordnung (German Railroad 
regulations) 
EVA  Estacion de Vision Artificial (artificial vision station) 
FHWA  Federal Highway Administration 
FRA  Federal Railroad Administration 
FSB  Full Service Brake 
FTA  Federal Transit Administration 96 
GIS  Geographic Information System 
GPS  Global Positioning System 
hsr  High Speed Rail 
ICE  Intercity-Express 
ITS  Intelligent Transportation System 
MAS  Maximum Authorized Speed 
MDT  Mobile Data Terminal 
MUTCD  Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices 
NEC  Northeast Corridor 
NHTSA  National Highway and Transportation Safety Administration 
NUTCD  National Committee on Uniform Traffic Control Devices 
PTC  Positive Train Control 
PTS  Positive Train Separation 
RAC  Railway Association of Canada 
RAIRS  Railroad Accident/Incident Reporting System 
RF  Radio Frequency 
SAPRR  Societe de Autoroute Paris-Rhin-Rhone 
TCS  Traffic Control System 
TIS  Traveler Information System 
USDOT  United States Department of Transportation 
VIP  Video Image Processing 
VNTSC  John A Volpe National Transportation Systems Center 
WAS  Vehicle Proximity Alerting System 
WADS  Wide Area Detection Systems 